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Message-ID: <aBoGFr5EaHFfxuON@li-008a6a4c-3549-11b2-a85c-c5cc2836eea2.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 6 May 2025 14:52:38 +0200
From: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@...cle.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] kasan: Avoid sleepable page allocation from
atomic context
On Wed, Apr 30, 2025 at 08:04:40AM +0900, Harry Yoo wrote:
Hi Harry,
> On Tue, Apr 29, 2025 at 06:08:41PM +0200, Alexander Gordeev wrote:
> > apply_to_pte_range() enters the lazy MMU mode and then invokes
> > kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte() callback on each page table walk
> > iteration. However, the callback can go into sleep when trying
> > to allocate a single page, e.g. if an architecutre disables
> > preemption on lazy MMU mode enter.
>
> Should we add a comment that pte_fn_t must not sleep in
> apply_to_pte_range()?
See the comment in include/linux/pgtable.h
"In the general case, no lock is guaranteed to be held between entry and exit
of the lazy mode. So the implementation must assume preemption may be enabled
and cpu migration is possible; it must take steps to be robust against this.
(In practice, for user PTE updates, the appropriate page table lock(s) are
held, but for kernel PTE updates, no lock is held)."
It is Ryan Roberts who brougth some order [1] here, but I would go further
and make things simple by enforcing the kernel PTE updates should also assume
the preemption is disabled.
But that is a separate topic and could only be done once this patch is in.
> > On s390 if make arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode() -> preempt_enable()
> > and arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode() -> preempt_disable(), such crash
> > occurs:
> >
> > [ 553.332108] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
> > [ 553.332117] no locks held by multipathd/2116.
> > [ 553.332128] CPU: 24 PID: 2116 Comm: multipathd Kdump: loaded Tainted:
> > [ 553.332139] Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 701 (LPAR)
> > [ 553.332146] Call Trace:
> > [ 553.332152] [<00000000158de23a>] dump_stack_lvl+0xfa/0x150
> > [ 553.332167] [<0000000013e10d12>] __might_resched+0x57a/0x5e8
> > [ 553.332178] [<00000000144eb6c2>] __alloc_pages+0x2ba/0x7c0
> > [ 553.332189] [<00000000144d5cdc>] __get_free_pages+0x2c/0x88
> > [ 553.332198] [<00000000145663f6>] kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte+0x4e/0x110
> > [ 553.332207] [<000000001447625c>] apply_to_pte_range+0x164/0x3c8
> > [ 553.332218] [<000000001448125a>] apply_to_pmd_range+0xda/0x318
> > [ 553.332226] [<000000001448181c>] __apply_to_page_range+0x384/0x768
> > [ 553.332233] [<0000000014481c28>] apply_to_page_range+0x28/0x38
> > [ 553.332241] [<00000000145665da>] kasan_populate_vmalloc+0x82/0x98
> > [ 553.332249] [<00000000144c88d0>] alloc_vmap_area+0x590/0x1c90
> > [ 553.332257] [<00000000144ca108>] __get_vm_area_node.constprop.0+0x138/0x260
> > [ 553.332265] [<00000000144d17fc>] __vmalloc_node_range+0x134/0x360
> > [ 553.332274] [<0000000013d5dbf2>] alloc_thread_stack_node+0x112/0x378
> > [ 553.332284] [<0000000013d62726>] dup_task_struct+0x66/0x430
> > [ 553.332293] [<0000000013d63962>] copy_process+0x432/0x4b80
> > [ 553.332302] [<0000000013d68300>] kernel_clone+0xf0/0x7d0
> > [ 553.332311] [<0000000013d68bd6>] __do_sys_clone+0xae/0xc8
> > [ 553.332400] [<0000000013d68dee>] __s390x_sys_clone+0xd6/0x118
> > [ 553.332410] [<0000000013c9d34c>] do_syscall+0x22c/0x328
> > [ 553.332419] [<00000000158e7366>] __do_syscall+0xce/0xf0
> > [ 553.332428] [<0000000015913260>] system_call+0x70/0x98
> >
> > Instead of allocating single pages per-PTE, bulk-allocate the
> > shadow memory prior to applying kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte()
> > callback on a page range.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
> > Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> > Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9ef4 ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory")
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>
> > ---
> > mm/kasan/shadow.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
> > 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> > index 88d1c9dcb507..ea9a06715a81 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> > @@ -292,30 +292,65 @@ void __init __weak kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start,
> > {
> > }
> >
> > +struct vmalloc_populate_data {
> > + unsigned long start;
> > + struct page **pages;
> > +};
> > +
> > static int kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
> > - void *unused)
> > + void *_data)
> > {
> > - unsigned long page;
> > + struct vmalloc_populate_data *data = _data;
> > + struct page *page;
> > + unsigned long pfn;
> > pte_t pte;
> >
> > if (likely(!pte_none(ptep_get(ptep))))
> > return 0;
> >
> > - page = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> > - if (!page)
> > - return -ENOMEM;
> > -
> > - __memset((void *)page, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID, PAGE_SIZE);
> > - pte = pfn_pte(PFN_DOWN(__pa(page)), PAGE_KERNEL);
> > + page = data->pages[PFN_DOWN(addr - data->start)];
> > + pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
> > + __memset(pfn_to_virt(pfn), KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID, PAGE_SIZE);
> > + pte = pfn_pte(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL);
> >
> > spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
> > - if (likely(pte_none(ptep_get(ptep)))) {
> > + if (likely(pte_none(ptep_get(ptep))))
> > set_pte_at(&init_mm, addr, ptep, pte);
> > - page = 0;
>
> With this patch, now if the pte is already set, the page is leaked?
Yes. But currently it is leaked for previously allocated pages anyway,
so no change in behaviour (unless I misread the code).
> Should we set data->pages[PFN_DOWN(addr - data->start)] = NULL
> and free non-null elements later in __kasan_populate_vmalloc()?
Should the allocation fail on boot, the kernel would not fly anyway.
If for whatever reason we want to free, that should be a follow-up
change, as far as I am concerned.
> > - }
> > spin_unlock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
> > - if (page)
> > - free_page(page);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int __kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long nr_pages, nr_total = PFN_UP(end - start);
> > + struct vmalloc_populate_data data;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + data.pages = (struct page **)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!data.pages)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > + while (nr_total) {
> > + nr_pages = min(nr_total, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(data.pages[0]));
> > + __memset(data.pages, 0, nr_pages * sizeof(data.pages[0]));
> > + if (nr_pages != alloc_pages_bulk(GFP_KERNEL, nr_pages, data.pages)) {
>
> When the return value of alloc_pages_bulk() is less than nr_pages,
> you still need to free pages in the array unless nr_pages is zero.
Same reasoning for not to free as above.
> > + free_page((unsigned long)data.pages);
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > + }
> > +
> > + data.start = start;
> > + ret = apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, start, nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE,
> > + kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte, &data);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + start += nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
> > + nr_total -= nr_pages;
> > + }
> > +
> > + free_page((unsigned long)data.pages);
> > +
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > @@ -348,9 +383,7 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> > shadow_start = PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(shadow_start);
> > shadow_end = PAGE_ALIGN(shadow_end);
> >
> > - ret = apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, shadow_start,
> > - shadow_end - shadow_start,
> > - kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte, NULL);
> > + ret = __kasan_populate_vmalloc(shadow_start, shadow_end);
> > if (ret)
> > return ret;
> >
> > --
> > 2.45.2
> >
> >
1. https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250303141542.3371656-2-ryan.roberts@arm.com/#t
> --
> Cheers,
> Harry / Hyeonggon
Thanks!
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