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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRKwB4quqBtYQyxRqCX2C6fCgTbyAP3Ov+NdQ06t1aFdA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 16:25:15 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@...onical.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>, 
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, john.johansen@...onical.com, 
	jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, mic@...ikod.net, kees@...nel.org, 
	stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com, 
	takedakn@...data.co.jp, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] lsm: introduce security_lsm_manage_policy hook

On Wed, May 7, 2025 at 6:41 AM Tetsuo Handa
<penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
> On 2025/05/06 23:32, Maxime Bélair wrote:
> > diff --git a/security/lsm_syscalls.c b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
> > index dcaad8818679..b39e6635a7d5 100644
> > --- a/security/lsm_syscalls.c
> > +++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
> > @@ -122,5 +122,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lsm_list_modules, u64 __user *, ids, u32 __user *, size,
> >  SYSCALL_DEFINE5(lsm_manage_policy, u32, lsm_id, u32, op, void __user *, buf, u32
> >               __user *, size, u32, flags)
> >  {
> > -     return 0;
> > +     size_t usize;
> > +
> > +     if (get_user(usize, size))
> > +             return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > +     return security_lsm_manage_policy(lsm_id, op, buf, usize, flags);
> >  }
>
> syzbot will report user-controlled unbounded huge size memory allocation attempt. ;-)
>
> This interface might be fine for AppArmor, but TOMOYO won't use this interface because
> TOMOYO's policy is line-oriented ASCII text data where the destination is switched via
> pseudo‑filesystem's filename ...

While Tetsuo's comment is limited to TOMOYO, I believe the argument
applies to a number of other LSMs as well.  The reality is that there
is no one policy ideal shared across LSMs and that complicates things
like the lsm_manage_policy() proposal.  I'm intentionally saying
"complicates" and not "prevents" because I don't want to flat out
reject something like this, but I think there needs to be a larger
discussion among the different LSM groups about what such an API
should look like.  We may not need to get every LSM to support this
new API, but we need to get something that would work for a
significant majority and would be general/extensible enough that we
would expect it to work with the majority of future LSMs (as much as
we can predict the future anyway).

--
paul-moore.com

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