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Message-Id: <20250509-jag-mv_ctltables_iter2-v1-8-d0ad83f5f4c3@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 09 May 2025 14:54:12 +0200
From: Joel Granados <joel.granados@...nel.org>
To: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@...e.com>, 
 Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>, 
 Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@...sung.com>, Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>, 
 Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, 
 Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>, 
 Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>, 
 Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>, 
 Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@...nel.org>, 
 Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>, 
 Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>, Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@...il.com>, 
 Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, 
 Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>, 
 Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>, Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211@...il.com>, 
 Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, 
 "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>, 
 Helge Deller <deller@....de>, 
 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, 
 Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-modules@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
 linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, rcu@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, 
 linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, linux-serial@...r.kernel.org, 
 Joel Granados <joel.granados@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 08/12] sysctl: Move tainted ctl_table into kernel/panic.c

Move the ctl_table with the "tainted" proc_name into kernel/panic.c.
With it moves the proc_tainted helper function.

This is part of a greater effort to move ctl tables into their
respective subsystems which will reduce the merge conflicts in
kernel/sysctl.c.

Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@...nel.org>
---
 kernel/panic.c  | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c | 49 -------------------------------------------------
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index 047ea3215312c439950c6ec4674a91572146234d..213c6c9d6a750ff3d17f3cf530b37c619cd816f4 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -84,6 +84,50 @@ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+
+/*
+ * Taint values can only be increased
+ * This means we can safely use a temporary.
+ */
+static int proc_taint(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+			       void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct ctl_table t;
+	unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
+	int err;
+
+	if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	t = *table;
+	t.data = &tmptaint;
+	err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
+	if (write) {
+		int i;
+
+		/*
+		 * If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing
+		 * false positives due to userspace input, bail out
+		 * before setting the requested taint flags.
+		 */
+		if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/*
+		 * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
+		 * to everyone's atomic.h for this
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
+			if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
+				add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 static const struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	{
@@ -96,6 +140,12 @@ static const struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
 		.extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE,
 	},
 #endif
+	{
+		.procname	= "tainted",
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(long),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_taint,
+	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "panic",
 		.data		= &panic_timeout,
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index ebcc7d75acd9fecbf3c10f31480c3cb6960cb53e..9d8db9cef11122993d850ab5c753e3da1cbfb5cc 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -731,49 +731,6 @@ int proc_douintvec(const struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
 				 do_proc_douintvec_conv, NULL);
 }
 
-/*
- * Taint values can only be increased
- * This means we can safely use a temporary.
- */
-static int proc_taint(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
-			       void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	struct ctl_table t;
-	unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
-	int err;
-
-	if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	t = *table;
-	t.data = &tmptaint;
-	err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
-	if (err < 0)
-		return err;
-
-	if (write) {
-		int i;
-
-		/*
-		 * If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing
-		 * false positives due to userspace input, bail out
-		 * before setting the requested taint flags.
-		 */
-		if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint))
-			return -EINVAL;
-
-		/*
-		 * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
-		 * to everyone's atomic.h for this
-		 */
-		for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
-			if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
-				add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
-	}
-
-	return err;
-}
-
 /**
  * struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_dointvec_minmax() range checking structure
  * @min: pointer to minimum allowable value
@@ -1557,12 +1514,6 @@ int proc_do_static_key(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 
 static const struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
-	{
-		.procname	= "tainted",
-		.maxlen 	= sizeof(long),
-		.mode		= 0644,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_taint,
-	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "sysctl_writes_strict",
 		.data		= &sysctl_writes_strict,

-- 
2.47.2



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