linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 00/11] bpf: Mitigate Spectre v1 using barriers

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Message-Id: 
 <174681603001.3715348.12288999798860158953.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 09 May 2025 18:40:30 +0000
From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf@...nel.org
To: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@....de>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 00/11] bpf: Mitigate Spectre v1 using barriers

Hello:

This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master)
by Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>:

On Thu,  1 May 2025 09:35:51 +0200 you wrote:
> This improves the expressiveness of unprivileged BPF by inserting
> speculation barriers instead of rejecting the programs.
> 
> The approach was previously presented at LPC'24 [1] and RAID'24 [2].
> 
> To mitigate the Spectre v1 (PHT) vulnerability, the kernel rejects
> potentially-dangerous unprivileged BPF programs as of
> commit 9183671af6db ("bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted
> branches"). In [2], we have analyzed 364 object files from open source
> projects (Linux Samples and Selftests, BCC, Loxilb, Cilium, libbpf
> Examples, Parca, and Prevail) and found that this affects 31% to 54% of
> programs.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [bpf-next,v3,01/11] selftests/bpf: Fix caps for __xlated/jited_unpriv
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/cf15cdc0f0f3
  - [bpf-next,v3,02/11] bpf: Move insn if/else into do_check_insn()
    (no matching commit)
  - [bpf-next,v3,03/11] bpf: Return -EFAULT on misconfigurations
    (no matching commit)
  - [bpf-next,v3,04/11] bpf: Return -EFAULT on internal errors
    (no matching commit)
  - [bpf-next,v3,05/11] bpf, arm64, powerpc: Add bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4()
    (no matching commit)
  - [bpf-next,v3,06/11] bpf, arm64, powerpc: Change nospec to include v1 barrier
    (no matching commit)
  - [bpf-next,v3,07/11] bpf: Rename sanitize_stack_spill to nospec_result
    (no matching commit)
  - [bpf-next,v3,08/11] bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1
    (no matching commit)
  - [bpf-next,v3,09/11] selftests/bpf: Add test for Spectre v1 mitigation
    (no matching commit)
  - [bpf-next,v3,10/11] bpf: Allow nospec-protected var-offset stack access
    (no matching commit)
  - [bpf-next,v3,11/11] bpf: Fall back to nospec for sanitization-failures
    (no matching commit)

You are awesome, thank you!
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