Message-ID: <c8faa0ca-1cbd-439f-bdf7-0bf34c2b9d91@canonical.com>
Date: Sun, 11 May 2025 04:09:58 -0700
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
 Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@...onical.com>,
 Song Liu <song@...nel.org>, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
 paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, kees@...nel.org,
 stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
 takedakn@...data.co.jp, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
 apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] Wire up the lsm_manage_policy syscall

On 5/9/25 03:25, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> On Thu, May 08, 2025 at 12:52:55AM -0700, John Johansen wrote:
>> On 5/7/25 15:04, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>>> On 2025/05/08 0:37, Maxime Bélair wrote:
>>>> Again, each module decides which operations to expose through this syscall. In many cases
>>>> the operation will still require CAP_SYS_ADMIN or a similar capability, so environments
>>>> that choose this interface remain secure while gaining its advantages.
>>>
>>> If the interpretation of "flags" argument varies across LSMs, it sounds like ioctl()'s
>>
>> yes that does feel like ioctls(), on the other hand defining them at the LSM level won't
>> offer LSMs flexibility making it so the syscall covers fewer use cases. I am not opposed
>> to either, it just hashing out what people want, and what is acceptable.
>>
>>> "cmd" argument. Also, there is prctl() which can already carry string-ish parameters
>>> without involving open(). Why can't we use prctl() instead of lsm_manage_policy() ?
>>>
>>
>> prctl() can be used, I used it for the unprivileged policy demo. It has its own set of
>> problems. While LSM policy could be associated with the process doing the load/replacement
>> or what ever operation, it isn't necessarily tied to it. A lot of LSM policy is not
>> process specific making prctl() a poor fit.
>>
>> prctl() requires allocating a global prctl()
>>
>> prctl() are already being filtered/controlled by LSMs making them a poort fit for
>> use by an LSM in a stacking situation as it requires updating the policy of other
>> LSMs on the system. Yes seccomp can filter the syscall but that still is an easier
>> barrier to overcome than having to have instruction for how to allow your LSMs
>> prctl() in multiple LSMs.
>>
>>
>> Mickaël already argued the need for landlock to have syscalls. See
> 
> Landlock indeed requires syscalls mainly because of its unprivileged
> nature.
> 

yes that is the dominant reason

>> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200511192156.1618284-7-mic@digikod.net/
>> and the numerous iterations before that.
> 
> This link might be misleading though, it points to an initial version of
> the syscall proposal (v17) and it was then decided to create one syscall
> per operation (v34), which is why we ended with 3 syscalls.  See the
> changelog:
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-9-mic@digikod.net
> 

yes and no. I am well aware landlock's syscall got split into three syscalls.

All I was trying to do is reference to the start of the discussion on why
landlock needed a syscall(s). I thought the details of why you have three
etc, really didn't add to the discussion. But yeah not also pointing to
v34 could be considered misleading.


>>
>> Ideally those could have been LSM syscalls, with landlock leveraging them.
> 
> I don't agree.  The Landlock syscalls have a well-defined semantic, with

First I don't begrudge Landlock its syscalls, I think at the time it was
the only way forward.

> documented security requirements, and they deal with specific kernel
> objects identified with file descriptors, including a dedicated one:
> [landlock-ruleset].

I am aware. Those semantics could have been kept and documented, within
a set of LSM syscalls. Yes landlock's syscalls shouldn't have been done
behind a single LSM syscall, I am not advocating for that but maybe
behind several LSM syscalls.

>  For the features provided by these Landlock
> syscalls, it would not have been a good idea to reuse existing syscalls,
> nor to rely on the syscall proposed in this series because the interface
> is too specific to some of the current privileged LSMs (i.e. ingest a
> policy blob).  Making this interface more generic would lead to even
> less defined semantic though.

Right, so again not a generic LSM syscall. But "generic" LSM syscalls
for certain purposes. Let me walk my statement back a little, what I
find unfortunate was that the landlock LSM syscalls didn't get discussed
as a set of generic LSM syscall's with landlock being the first to
implement them.

The question is hashing out where the generic semantics are vs. the
individual LSMs. Having an LSM syscall to deal with specific kernel
objects idenetified with file descriptors, and allowing each LSMs
to deal with that if it needs is possible.

Its a matter of figuring something out. It could be it turns out it is
not worth it. And some individual LSM syscalls like landlocks are the
way to go, its that it wasn't explored. I don't fault you, and think
it really wasn't even an option at the time.

> 
>> AppArmor
>> is getting to where it has similar needs to landlock. Yes we can use ioctls, prctls,
>> netlink, the fs, etc. it doesn't mean that those are the best interfaces to do so,
> 
> I think it would make sense to propose AppArmor-specific syscalls.
> 

that may be the case, but I think we should explore providing a more
LSM generic interface first.

>> and ideally any interface we use will be of benefit to some other LSMs in the future.
> 
> The LSM syscalls may make sense to deal with LSM blobs managed by the
> LSM framework (e.g. get/set properties) when the operations are
> common/generic.
> 
> Security policies are specific to each LSM and they should implement
> their own well-defined interface (e.g. filesystem, netlink, syscall).
> 
policies at some level are just blobs too. It is worth at least
exploring whether there can be a common interface.

> The LSM framework doesn't provide nor manage any security policy, it
> mainly provides a set of consistent and well-defined kernel hooks with
> security blobs to enforce a security policy.  I don't think it makes
> sense to add LSM syscalls to manage things not managed by the LSM
> framework.

we aren't talking about the LSM framework managing security policy,
just whether it makes sense for it to provide a common interface that
an LSM can choose to use to provide it a blob of policy that it
can then manage.

Its just a mechanism. This isn't all that different than using the
filesystem, netlink, or other mechanisms to shuttle the blob
between userspace to the kernel, and then the LSM manages its
policy and data.

The big difference is that using the syscall opens unprivileged
policy up to the LSM more broadly. If we are going to go the syscall
route for apparmor, we might as well see if we can't make that
mechanism more broadly available, and make it easier for other
LSMs in the future.

Again, it might turn out its a fools errand, and we have to do
an apparmor specific syscall, but it is worth exploring first.

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