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Message-ID: <20250511173055.406906-13-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de>
Date: Sun, 11 May 2025 19:30:13 +0200
From: Christian Göttsche <cgoettsche@...tendoof.de>
To: selinux@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 13/14] selinux: restrict policy strings
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
Validate the characters and the lengths of strings parsed from binary
policies.
* Disallow control characters
* Limit characters of identifiers to alphanumeric, underscore, dash,
and dot
* Limit identifiers in length to 64, expect types to 1024,
sensitivities to 32 and categories to 16, characters
(excluding NUL-terminator)
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
---
v3:
- introduce a central limits.h header
- add limits for all kinds of string: filesystem names, filetrans
keys, genfs paths, infiniband device names
v2:
- add wrappers for str_read() to minimize the usage of magic numbers
- limit sensitivities to a length of 32, to match categories,
suggested by Daniel
---
security/selinux/include/limits.h | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 5 +-
security/selinux/ss/conditional.h | 2 -
security/selinux/ss/constraint.h | 2 -
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++---------
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 51 +++++++++++++++++-
6 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/limits.h
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/limits.h b/security/selinux/include/limits.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d267c0c64f49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/limits.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Limits for various policy database elements.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported depth of conditional expressions.
+ */
+#define COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH 10
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported depth for constraint expressions.
+ */
+#define CEXPR_MAXDEPTH 5
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported identifier value.
+ *
+ * Reasoning: The most used symbols are types and they need to fit into
+ * an u16 for the avtab entries. Keep U16_MAX as special value
+ * and U16_MAX-1 to avoid accidental overflows into U16_MAX.
+ */
+#define IDENTIFIER_MAXVALUE (U16_MAX - 2)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported length of security context strings.
+ *
+ * Reasoning: The string must fir into a PAGE_SIZE.
+ */
+#define CONTEXT_MAXLENGTH 4000
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported boolean name length.
+ */
+#define BOOLEAN_NAME_MAXLENGTH 64
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported security class and common class name length.
+ */
+#define CLASS_NAME_MAXLENGTH 64
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported permission name length.
+ */
+#define PERMISSION_NAME_MAXLENGTH 64
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported user name length.
+ */
+#define USER_NAME_MAXLENGTH 64
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported role name length.
+ */
+#define ROLE_NAME_MAXLENGTH 64
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported type name length.
+ */
+#define TYPE_NAME_MAXLENGTH 1024
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported sensitivity name length.
+ */
+#define SENSITIVITY_NAME_MAXLENGTH 32
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported category name length.
+ */
+#define CATEGORY_NAME_MAXLENGTH 16
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported path name length for keys in filename transitions.
+ */
+#define FILETRANSKEY_NAME_MAXLENGTH 1024
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported filesystem name length.
+ */
+#define FILESYSTEM_NAME_MAXLENGTH 128
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported path prefix length for genfs statements.
+ */
+#define GENFS_PATH_MAXLENGTH 1024
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported Infiniband device name length.
+ */
+#define INFINIBAND_DEVNAME_MAXLENGTH 256
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index ce0281cce739..c0a2814dafdb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -245,7 +245,8 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
booldatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
+ if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim ||
+ booldatum->value > IDENTIFIER_MAXVALUE)
return -EINVAL;
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS][booldatum->value - 1] = key;
@@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_bool(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto err;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
index 468e98ad3ea1..d5aefcbaa1eb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@
#include "policydb.h"
#include "../include/conditional.h"
-#define COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH 10
-
/*
* A conditional expression is a list of operators and operands
* in reverse polish notation.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
index 1d75a8a044df..f986156de856 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@
#include "ebitmap.h"
-#define CEXPR_MAXDEPTH 5
-
struct constraint_expr {
#define CEXPR_NOT 1 /* not expr */
#define CEXPR_AND 2 /* expr and expr */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 2b098d9abf17..e64254985762 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -552,7 +552,8 @@ static int common_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
comdatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!comdatum->value || comdatum->value > p->p_commons.nprim)
+ if (!comdatum->value || comdatum->value > p->p_commons.nprim ||
+ comdatum->value > IDENTIFIER_MAXVALUE)
return -EINVAL;
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS][comdatum->value - 1] = key;
@@ -567,7 +568,8 @@ static int class_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
cladatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!cladatum->value || cladatum->value > p->p_classes.nprim)
+ if (!cladatum->value || cladatum->value > p->p_classes.nprim ||
+ cladatum->value > IDENTIFIER_MAXVALUE)
return -EINVAL;
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES][cladatum->value - 1] = key;
@@ -583,6 +585,7 @@ static int role_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
role = datum;
p = datap;
if (!role->value || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim ||
+ role->value > IDENTIFIER_MAXVALUE ||
role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -601,6 +604,7 @@ static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
if (typdatum->primary) {
if (!typdatum->value || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim ||
+ typdatum->value > IDENTIFIER_MAXVALUE ||
typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES][typdatum->value - 1] = key;
@@ -618,6 +622,7 @@ static int user_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
usrdatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (!usrdatum->value || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim ||
+ usrdatum->value > IDENTIFIER_MAXVALUE ||
usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -634,7 +639,8 @@ static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
levdatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!levdatum->level.sens || levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ if (!levdatum->level.sens || levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim ||
+ levdatum->level.sens > IDENTIFIER_MAXVALUE)
return -EINVAL;
if (!levdatum->isalias)
@@ -651,7 +657,8 @@ static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
catdatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+ if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim ||
+ catdatum->value > IDENTIFIER_MAXVALUE)
return -EINVAL;
if (!catdatum->isalias)
@@ -1226,8 +1233,9 @@ static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c, struct policydb *p,
* binary representation file.
*/
-int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len, int kind, u32 max_len)
{
+ u32 i;
int rc;
char *str;
@@ -1237,19 +1245,35 @@ int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
if (size_check(sizeof(char), len, fp))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (len > max_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = next_entry(str, fp, len);
- if (rc) {
- kfree(str);
- return rc;
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad_str;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (iscntrl(str[i]))
+ goto bad_str;
+
+ if (kind == STR_IDENTIFIER &&
+ !(isalnum(str[i]) || str[i] == '_' || str[i] == '-' || str[i] == '.'))
+ goto bad_str;
+
}
str[len] = '\0';
*strp = str;
return 0;
+
+bad_str:
+ kfree(str);
+ return rc;
}
static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
@@ -1274,7 +1298,7 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
goto bad;
- rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_perm(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -1321,7 +1345,7 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
goto bad;
comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_class(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -1559,12 +1583,12 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
- rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_class(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
if (len2) {
- rc = str_read(&cladatum->comkey, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len2);
+ rc = str_read_class(&cladatum->comkey, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len2);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -1698,7 +1722,7 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
role->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_role(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -1765,7 +1789,7 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
}
- rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_type(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -1829,7 +1853,7 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_user(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -1878,7 +1902,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
goto bad;
levdatum->isalias = val;
- rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_sens(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -1921,7 +1945,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp
goto bad;
catdatum->isalias = val;
- rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_cat(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -2230,7 +2254,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, struct policy_f
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
/* path component string */
- rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len, STR_UNCONSTRAINT, FILETRANSKEY_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2329,7 +2353,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
/* path component string */
- rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len, STR_UNCONSTRAINT, FILETRANSKEY_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2483,7 +2507,7 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
if (!newgenfs)
goto out;
- rc = str_read(&newgenfs->fstype, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_fsname(&newgenfs->fstype, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -2522,7 +2546,8 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
if (!newc)
goto out;
- rc = str_read(&newc->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&newc->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len,
+ STR_UNCONSTRAINT, GENFS_PATH_MAXLENGTH);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -2625,7 +2650,7 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
goto out;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_fsname(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -2693,7 +2718,7 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
goto out;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read_fsname(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -2759,7 +2784,9 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rc = str_read(&c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
- GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ GFP_KERNEL, fp, len,
+ STR_UNCONSTRAINT,
+ INFINIBAND_DEVNAME_MAXLENGTH);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -2827,7 +2854,8 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
goto bad;
}
- rc = str_read(&policydb_str, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&policydb_str, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len,
+ STR_UNCONSTRAINT, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
if (rc) {
if (rc == -ENOMEM) {
pr_err("SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb string of length %d\n",
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index b4f0c1a754cf..e901ec648cbf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include "mls_types.h"
#include "context.h"
#include "constraint.h"
+#include "limits.h"
/*
* A datum type is defined for each kind of symbol
@@ -408,7 +409,55 @@ static inline bool val_is_boolean(u32 value)
return value == 0 || value == 1;
}
-extern int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len);
+#define STR_UNCONSTRAINT 0
+#define STR_IDENTIFIER 1
+extern int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len,
+ int kind, u32 max_len);
+
+static inline int str_read_bool(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ return str_read(strp, flags, fp, len, STR_IDENTIFIER, BOOLEAN_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
+}
+
+static inline int str_read_cat(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ return str_read(strp, flags, fp, len, STR_IDENTIFIER, CATEGORY_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
+}
+
+static inline int str_read_class(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ return str_read(strp, flags, fp, len, STR_IDENTIFIER, CLASS_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
+}
+
+static inline int str_read_perm(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ return str_read(strp, flags, fp, len, STR_IDENTIFIER, PERMISSION_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
+}
+
+static inline int str_read_role(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ return str_read(strp, flags, fp, len, STR_IDENTIFIER, ROLE_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
+}
+
+static inline int str_read_sens(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ return str_read(strp, flags, fp, len, STR_IDENTIFIER, SENSITIVITY_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
+}
+
+static inline int str_read_type(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ return str_read(strp, flags, fp, len, STR_IDENTIFIER, TYPE_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
+}
+
+static inline int str_read_user(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ return str_read(strp, flags, fp, len, STR_IDENTIFIER, USER_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
+}
+
+static inline int str_read_fsname(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ return str_read(strp, flags, fp, len, STR_IDENTIFIER, FILESYSTEM_NAME_MAXLENGTH);
+}
extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
--
2.49.0
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