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Message-ID: <20250513110405.15872-1-bp@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 13 May 2025 13:04:05 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...nel.org>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Fix SRSO reporting on Zen1/2 with SMT disabled
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>
1f4bb068b498 ("x86/bugs: Restructure SRSO mitigation") does this:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
return;
}
and, in particular, sets srso_mitigation to NONE. This leads to
reporting
Speculative Return Stack Overflow: Vulnerable
on Zen2 machines.
There's a far bigger confusion with what SRSO_NO means and how it is
used in the code but this will be a matter of future fixes and
restructuring to how the SRSO mitigation gets determined.
Fix the reporting issue for now.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 47c74c4ae206..dd8b50b4ceaa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2942,7 +2942,9 @@ static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void)
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE))
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) && !cpu_mitigations_off())
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) &&
+ !cpu_mitigations_off() &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
}
--
2.43.0
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