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Message-ID: <49e708ca4a2777c955ca8780117a78acc984dbbd.camel@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 17:32:44 +0000
From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: "Zhao, Yan Y" <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>
CC: "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, "Li, Xiaoyao"
<xiaoyao.li@...el.com>, "quic_eberman@...cinc.com"
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 04/21] KVM: TDX: Enforce 4KB mapping level during TD
build Time
On Thu, 2025-05-15 at 17:16 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> On Wed, May 14, 2025 at 03:12:10AM +0800, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> > On Thu, 2025-04-24 at 11:05 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > > During the TD build phase (i.e., before the TD becomes RUNNABLE), enforce a
> > > 4KB mapping level both in the S-EPT managed by the TDX module and the
> > > mirror page table managed by KVM.
> > >
> > > During this phase, TD's memory is added via tdh_mem_page_add(), which only
> > > accepts 4KB granularity. Therefore, return PG_LEVEL_4K in TDX's
> > > .private_max_mapping_level hook to ensure KVM maps at the 4KB level in the
> > > mirror page table. Meanwhile, iterate over each 4KB page of a large gmem
> > > backend page in tdx_gmem_post_populate() and invoke tdh_mem_page_add() to
> > > map at the 4KB level in the S-EPT.
> > >
> > > Still allow huge pages in gmem backend during TD build time. Based on [1],
> > > which gmem series allows 2MB TPH and non-in-place conversion, pass in
> > > region.nr_pages to kvm_gmem_populate() in tdx_vcpu_init_mem_region().
> > >
> >
> > This commit log will need to be written with upstream in mind when it is out of
> > RFC.
> Ok.
>
>
> > > This
> > > enables kvm_gmem_populate() to allocate huge pages from the gmem backend
> > > when the remaining nr_pages, GFN alignment, and page private/shared
> > > attribute permit. KVM is then able to promote the initial 4K mapping to
> > > huge after TD is RUNNABLE.
> > >
> > > Disallow any private huge pages during TD build time. Use BUG_ON() in
> > > tdx_mem_page_record_premap_cnt() and tdx_is_sept_zap_err_due_to_premap() to
> > > assert the mapping level is 4KB.
> > >
> > > Opportunistically, remove unused parameters in
> > > tdx_mem_page_record_premap_cnt().
> > >
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241212063635.712877-1-michael.roth@amd.com [1]
> > > Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>
> > > ---
> > > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
> > > 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > > index 98cde20f14da..03885cb2869b 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > > @@ -1530,14 +1530,16 @@ static int tdx_mem_page_aug(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
> > > * The counter has to be zero on KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM, to ensure that there
> > > * are no half-initialized shared EPT pages.
> > > */
> > > -static int tdx_mem_page_record_premap_cnt(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
> > > - enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
> > > +static int tdx_mem_page_record_premap_cnt(struct kvm *kvm, enum pg_level level)
> > > {
> > > struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> > >
> > > if (KVM_BUG_ON(kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed, kvm))
> > > return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > > + if (KVM_BUG_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm))
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > /* nr_premapped will be decreased when tdh_mem_page_add() is called. */
> > > atomic64_inc(&kvm_tdx->nr_premapped);
> > > return 0;
> > > @@ -1571,7 +1573,7 @@ int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
> > > if (likely(kvm_tdx->state == TD_STATE_RUNNABLE))
> > > return tdx_mem_page_aug(kvm, gfn, level, page);
> > >
> > > - return tdx_mem_page_record_premap_cnt(kvm, gfn, level, pfn);
> > > + return tdx_mem_page_record_premap_cnt(kvm, level);
> > > }
> > >
> > > static int tdx_sept_drop_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
> > > @@ -1666,7 +1668,7 @@ int tdx_sept_link_private_spt(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
> > > static int tdx_is_sept_zap_err_due_to_premap(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u64 err,
> > > u64 entry, int level)
> > > {
> > > - if (!err || kvm_tdx->state == TD_STATE_RUNNABLE)
> > > + if (!err || kvm_tdx->state == TD_STATE_RUNNABLE || level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
> > > return false;
> >
> > This is catching zapping huge pages before the TD is runnable? Is it necessary
> > if we are already warning about mapping huge pages before the TD is runnable in
> > tdx_mem_page_record_premap_cnt()?
> Under normal conditions, this check isn't necessary.
> I added this check in case bugs in the KVM core MMU where the mirror page table
> might be updated to huge without notifying the TDX side.
> Am I overthinking?
If we need so many BUG_ON()s maybe our design is too fragile. I think we could
drop this one.
>
>
> > > if (err != (TDX_EPT_ENTRY_STATE_INCORRECT | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX))
> > > @@ -3052,8 +3054,8 @@ struct tdx_gmem_post_populate_arg {
> > > __u32 flags;
> > > };
> > >
> > > -static int tdx_gmem_post_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> > > - void __user *src, int order, void *_arg)
> > > +static int tdx_gmem_post_populate_4k(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> > > + void __user *src, void *_arg)
> > > {
> > > u64 error_code = PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK | PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS;
> > > struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> > > @@ -3120,6 +3122,21 @@ static int tdx_gmem_post_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +static int tdx_gmem_post_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> > > + void __user *src, int order, void *_arg)
> > > +{
> > > + unsigned long i, npages = 1 << order;
> > > + int ret;
> > > +
> > > + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
> > > + ret = tdx_gmem_post_populate_4k(kvm, gfn + i, pfn + i,
> > > + src + i * PAGE_SIZE, _arg);
> > > + if (ret)
> > > + return ret;
> > > + }
> > > + return 0;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > static int tdx_vcpu_init_mem_region(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
> > > {
> > > struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
> > > @@ -3166,20 +3183,15 @@ static int tdx_vcpu_init_mem_region(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *c
> > > };
> > > gmem_ret = kvm_gmem_populate(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(region.gpa),
> > > u64_to_user_ptr(region.source_addr),
> > > - 1, tdx_gmem_post_populate, &arg);
> > > + region.nr_pages, tdx_gmem_post_populate, &arg);
> > > if (gmem_ret < 0) {
> > > ret = gmem_ret;
> > > break;
> > > }
> > >
> > > - if (gmem_ret != 1) {
> This line is removed.
Doh! Right.
>
> > > - ret = -EIO;
> > > - break;
> > > - }
> > > -
> > > - region.source_addr += PAGE_SIZE;
> > > - region.gpa += PAGE_SIZE;
> > > - region.nr_pages--;
> > > + region.source_addr += PAGE_SIZE * gmem_ret;
> >
> > gmem_ret has to be 1, per the above conditional.
> As region.nr_pages instead of 1 is passed into kvm_gmem_populate(), gmem_ret
> can now be greater than 1.
>
> kvm_gmem_populate() can allocate huge backend pages if region.nr_pages, GFN
> alignment, and shareability permit.
>
> > > + region.gpa += PAGE_SIZE * gmem_ret;
> > > + region.nr_pages -= gmem_ret;
> > >
> > > cond_resched();
> > > }
> > > @@ -3224,6 +3236,9 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
> > >
> > > int tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
> > > {
> > > + if (unlikely(to_kvm_tdx(kvm)->state != TD_STATE_RUNNABLE))
> > > + return PG_LEVEL_4K;
> > > +
> > > return PG_LEVEL_4K;
> >
> > ^ Change does nothing...
> Right. Patch 9 will update the default level to PG_LEVEL_2M.
>
> The change here is meant to highlight PG_LEVEL_4K is enforced in
> tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level() when TD is not in TD_STATE_RUNNABLE state.
>
> Will change it in the next version.
I can't see the pattern between what goes in this patch vs patch 9. We should
have some reasoning behind it.
>
> > > }
> > >
> >
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