linux-kernel - [PATCH v2] fs: allow clone_private_mount() for a path on real rootfs

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Message-ID: <20250515122057.159582-1-kazuma-kondo@nec.com>
Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 12:18:30 +0000
From: KONDO KAZUMA(近藤　和真)
	<kazuma-kondo@....com>
To: "viro@...iv.linux.org.uk" <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, "brauner@...nel.org"
	<brauner@...nel.org>, "jack@...e.cz" <jack@...e.cz>
CC: "mike@...ynton.com" <mike@...ynton.com>, "miklos@...redi.hu"
	<miklos@...redi.hu>, "amir73il@...il.com" <amir73il@...il.com>,
	"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org" <linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	KONDO KAZUMA(近藤　和真)
	<kazuma-kondo@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] fs: allow clone_private_mount() for a path on real rootfs

Mounting overlayfs with a directory on real rootfs (initramfs)
as upperdir has failed with following message since commit
db04662e2f4f ("fs: allow detached mounts in clone_private_mount()").

  [    4.080134] overlayfs: failed to clone upperpath

Overlayfs mount uses clone_private_mount() to create internal mount
for the underlying layers.

The commit made clone_private_mount() reject real rootfs because
it does not have a parent mount and is in the initial mount namespace,
that is not an anonymous mount namespace.

This issue can be fixed by modifying the permission check
of clone_private_mount() following [1].

Fixes: db04662e2f4f ("fs: allow detached mounts in clone_private_mount()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250514190252.GQ2023217@ZenIV/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250506194849.GT2023217@ZenIV/
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kazuma Kondo <kazuma-kondo@....com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Rewrite a code following [1].
- Add a comment for a condition.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250514002650.118278-1-kazuma-kondo@nec.com/
---
 fs/namespace.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 1b466c54a357..306d144d691b 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2482,18 +2482,19 @@ struct vfsmount *clone_private_mount(const struct path *path)
 	if (IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(old_mnt))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	if (mnt_has_parent(old_mnt)) {
-		if (!check_mnt(old_mnt))
-			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	} else {
-		if (!is_mounted(&old_mnt->mnt))
-			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-
-		/* Make sure this isn't something purely kernel internal. */
-		if (!is_anon_ns(old_mnt->mnt_ns))
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the source mount is acceptable.
+	 * Anything mounted in our mount namespace is allowed.
+	 * Otherwise, it must be the root of an anonymous mount
+	 * namespace, and we need to make sure no namespace
+	 * loops get created.
+	 */
+	if (!check_mnt(old_mnt)) {
+		if (!is_mounted(&old_mnt->mnt) ||
+			!is_anon_ns(old_mnt->mnt_ns) ||
+			mnt_has_parent(old_mnt))
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-		/* Make sure we don't create mount namespace loops. */
 		if (!check_for_nsfs_mounts(old_mnt))
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
-- 
2.49.0