[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <bd704149-694f-4d89-90d9-a22307488743@linaro.org>
Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:47:12 +0100
From: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@...aro.org>
To: Vikash Garodia <quic_vgarodia@...cinc.com>,
Dikshita Agarwal <quic_dikshita@...cinc.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...nel.org>,
Stanimir Varbanov <stanimir.varbanov@...aro.org>,
Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@...co.com>
Cc: linux-media@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Vedang Nagar <quic_vnagar@...cinc.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] media: venus: fix TOCTOU vulnerability when
reading packets from shared memory
On 15/05/2025 13:11, Vikash Garodia wrote:
>> But what if the "malicious" firmware only updated the data in the packet, not
>> the length - or another field we are not checking ?
> That does not cause any vulnerability. You can check and suggest if you see a
> vulnerability when the data outside length is an issue w.r.t vulnerability.
I don't believe you have identified a vulnerability here.
You read a length field, you check that length field against a MAX size.
Re-reading to see if the firmware wrote new bad data to the transmitted
packet in-memory is not a fix before or after the memcpy() because the
time you do that re-read is not fixed - locked wrt the freerunning firmware.
---
bod
Powered by blists - more mailing lists