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Message-Id: <20250516150400.512375-1-zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Date: Fri, 16 May 2025 15:04:00 +0000
From: Zilin Guan <zilin@....edu.cn>
To: przemyslaw.kitszel@...el.com
Cc: andrew+netdev@...n.ch,
anthony.l.nguyen@...el.com,
davem@...emloft.net,
dawid.osuchowski@...ux.intel.com,
edumazet@...gle.com,
intel-wired-lan@...ts.osuosl.org,
jianhao.xu@....edu.cn,
kuba@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
pabeni@...hat.com,
zilin@....edu.cn
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ixgbe/ipsec: use memzero_explicit() for stack SA structs
On Thu, May 15, 2025 at 11:27:22AM+0200, Przemek Kitszel wrote:
> the general rule is to memzero_explicit() memory that was holding secure
> content
> --
> to have full picture: it is fine to memset() such storage prior to use,
> it is also fine to combine related changes in one commit/one series
>
> re stated purpose of the patch:
> I see @rsa cleaned in just one exit point of ixgbe_ipsec_add_sa(),
> instead of all of them, so v2 seems warranted
Hi Przemek,
Thank you for your detailed feedback and clarification.
As Dawid pointed out, while @rsa is cleared at one exit point in
ixgbe_ipsec_add_sa(), another exit path, at which we fail to acquire the
RX SA table, leaves rsa.key and rsa.salt zeroed. Does this imply there's
no sensitive data to clear in this case? If so, would using memset() on
the symmetric error path in @tsa be redundant, or am I overlooking
something?
I'd appreciate your thoughts on this.
Best regards,
Zilin Guan
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