linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 00/12] Private MMIO support for private assigned dev

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Message-ID: <aCf1XNQamIJLi+OL@yilunxu-OptiPlex-7050>
Date: Sat, 17 May 2025 10:33:00 +0800
From: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@...ux.intel.com>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
Cc: Zhi Wang <zhiw@...dia.com>, Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>,
	kvm@...r.kernel.org, dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org,
	linux-media@...r.kernel.org, linaro-mm-sig@...ts.linaro.org,
	sumit.semwal@...aro.org, christian.koenig@....com,
	pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com, alex.williamson@...hat.com,
	vivek.kasireddy@...el.com, dan.j.williams@...el.com,
	yilun.xu@...el.com, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, lukas@...ner.de, yan.y.zhao@...el.com,
	daniel.vetter@...ll.ch, leon@...nel.org, baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com,
	zhenzhong.duan@...el.com, tao1.su@...el.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/12] Private MMIO support for private assigned dev

On Fri, May 16, 2025 at 09:49:53AM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Fri, May 16, 2025 at 02:19:45PM +0800, Xu Yilun wrote:
> > > I don't know why you'd disable a viommu while the VM is running,
> > > doesn't make sense.
> > 
> > Here it means remove the CC setup for viommu, shared setup is still
> > kept.
> 
> That might makes sense for the vPCI function, but not the vIOMMU. A
> secure VIOMMU needs to be running at all times while the guest is
> running. Perhaps it has no devices it can be used with, but it's
> functionality has to be there because a driver in the VM will be
> connected to it.
> 
> At most "bind" should only tell the already existing secure vIOMMU
> that it is allowed to translate for a specific vPCI function.

So I think something like:

struct iommufd_vdevice_ops {
	int (*setup_trusted_dma)(struct iommufd_vdevice *vdev); //for Bind
	void (*remove_trusted_dma)(struct iommufd_vdevice *vdev); //for Unbind
};

Thanks,
Yilun

> 
> Jason
>