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Message-ID: <36ea1ee7-bb6c-47ff-a6cf-18f43fb23493@lucifer.local>
Date: Mon, 19 May 2025 20:26:40 +0100
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@...e.de>, Xu Xin <xu.xin16@....com.cn>,
Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@...ux.dev>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] mm: prevent KSM from completely breaking VMA merging
On Mon, May 19, 2025 at 09:11:10PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 19.05.25 21:02, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> > On Mon, May 19, 2025 at 08:04:22PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > >
> > > > > +/*
> > > > > + * Are we guaranteed no driver can change state such as to preclude KSM merging?
> > > > > + * If so, let's set the KSM mergeable flag early so we don't break VMA merging.
> > > > > + *
> > > > > + * This is applicable when PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE has been set on the mm_struct via
> > > > > + * prctl() causing newly mapped VMAs to have the KSM mergeable VMA flag set.
> > > > > + *
> > > > > + * If this is not the case, then we set the flag after considering mergeability,
> > > > > + * which will prevent mergeability as, when PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE is set, a new
> > > > > + * VMA will not have the KSM mergeability VMA flag set, but all other VMAs will,
> > > > > + * preventing any merge.
> > > >
> > > > Hmmm, so an ordinary MAP_PRIVATE of any file (executable etc.) will get
> > > > VM_MERGEABLE set but not be able to merge?
> > > >
> > > > Probably these are not often expected to be merged ...
> > > >
> > > > Preventing merging should really only happen because of VMA flags that
> > > > are getting set: VM_PFNMAP, VM_MIXEDMAP, VM_DONTEXPAND, VM_IO.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > I am not 100% sure why we bail out on special mappings: all we have to
> > > > do is reliably identify anon pages, and we should be able to do that.
> > > >
> > > > GUP does currently refuses any VM_PFNMAP | VM_IO, and KSM uses GUP,
> > > > which might need a tweak then (maybe the solution could be to ... not
> > > > use GUP but a folio_walk).
> > >
> > > Oh, someone called "David" already did that. Nice :)
> > >
> > > So we *should* be able to drop
> > >
> > > * VM_PFNMAP: we correctly identify CoWed pages
> > > * VM_MIXEDMAP: we correctly identify CoWed pages
> > > * VM_IO: should not affect CoWed pages
> > > * VM_DONTEXPAND: no idea why that should even matter here
> >
> > I objected in the other thread but now realise I forgot we're talking about
> > MAP_PRIVATE... So we can do the CoW etc. Right.
> >
> > Then we just need to be able to copy the thing on CoW... but what about
> > write-through etc. cache settings? I suppose we don't care once CoW'd...
>
> Yes. It's ordinary kernel-managed memory.
Yeah, it's the CoW'd bit right? So it's fine.
>
> >
> > But is this common enough of a use case to be worth the hassle of checking this
> > is all ok?
>
> The reason I bring it up is because
>
> 1) Just because some drivers do weird mmap() things, we cannot merge any
> MAP_PRIVATE file mappings (except shmem ;) and mmap_prepare).
>
> 2) The whole "early_ksm" checks/handling would go away, making this patch
> significantly simpler :)
OK you're starting to convince me...
Maybe this isn't such a big deal if the KSM code handles it already anwyay.
If you're sure GUP isn't relying on this... it could be an additional patch
like:
'remove VM_SPECIAL limitation, KSM can already handle this'
And probably we _should_ let any insane driver blow up if they change stupid
things they must not change.
>
> --
> Cheers,
>
> David / dhildenb
>
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