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Message-ID:
	<TYSPR06MB71586268DF7C558479DB7248F69FA@TYSPR06MB7158.apcprd06.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Wed, 21 May 2025 09:42:11 +0000
From: "huk23@...udan.edu.cn" <huk23@...udan.edu.cn>
To: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@...nel.org>, WANG Xuerui <kernel@...0n.name>
CC: Jiaji Qin <jjtan24@...udan.edu.cn>, Shuoran Bai <baishuoran@...eu.edu.cn>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"syzkaller@...glegroups.com" <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>,
	"loongarch@...ts.linux.dev" <loongarch@...ts.linux.dev>
Subject: KASAN: out-of-bounds Read in unwind_next_frame

Dear Maintainers,



When using our customized Syzkaller to fuzz the latest Linux kernel, the following crash (100th)was triggered.


HEAD commit: 6537cfb395f352782918d8ee7b7f10ba2cc3cbf2
git tree: upstream
Output:https://github.com/pghk13/Kernel-Bug/blob/main/0520_6.15-rc6/100_KASAN%3A%20out-of-bounds%20Read%20in%20unwind_next_frame/100report.txt
Kernel config:https://github.com/pghk13/Kernel-Bug/blob/main/0520_6.15-rc6/config.txt
C reproducer:https://github.com/pghk13/Kernel-Bug/blob/main/0520_6.15-rc6/100_KASAN%3A%20out-of-bounds%20Read%20in%20unwind_next_frame/100repro.c
Syzlang reproducer:https://github.com/pghk13/Kernel-Bug/blob/main/0520_6.15-rc6/100_KASAN%3A%20out-of-bounds%20Read%20in%20unwind_next_frame/100repro.txt


The issue might occur in the stack_access_ok function call, which attempts to validate whether an address is within a valid stack range. In theASAN report, we see an out-of-bounds read of size 2, corresponding to the address ffff c90013b67600 Note the on_stack function within the stack_access_ok function, which triggers the out-of-bounds read when checking if an address is within the stack range, and invalid address is calculated when preparing to execute p = (unsigned long *)(state->sp   orc->ra_offset); or regs = (struct pt_regsstate->sp;
Most likely, a pointer calculation in the unwind_next_frame function resulted in an invalid address, and KASAN detected the out-of- access when the code tried to read data via that address.
We have reproduced this issue several times on 6.15-rc6 again.






If you fix this issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: Kun Hu <huk23@...udan.edu.cn>, Jiaji Qin <jjtan24@...udan.edu.cn>, Shuoran Bai <baishuoran@...eu.edu.cn>


==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in unwind_next_frame+0xd87/0x1c20
Read of size 2 at addr ffffc90013b67600 by task kworker/3:3/14224

CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 14224 Comm: kworker/3:3 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6 #1 PREEMPT(full) 
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events console_callback
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1b0
 print_report+0xc1/0x630
 kasan_report+0x96/0xd0
 unwind_next_frame+0xd87/0x1c20
 show_trace_log_lvl+0x20c/0x380
 sched_show_task+0x410/0x660
 show_state_filter+0xf7/0x390
 k_spec+0xeb/0x140
 kbd_event+0xdd9/0x3930
 input_handle_events_default+0x10a/0x1a0
 input_pass_values+0x68d/0x870
 input_event_dispose+0x4db/0x640
 input_handle_event+0x122/0xde0
 input_event+0x83/0xb0
 hidinput_hid_event+0xa7b/0x2040
 hid_process_event+0x4a6/0x5d0
 hid_input_array_field+0x4dc/0x670
 hid_report_raw_event+0xa53/0x1230
 __hid_input_report.constprop.0+0x33d/0x440
 hid_irq_in+0x35d/0x850
 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e5/0x6b0
 usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x391/0x450
 dummy_timer+0x124b/0x3580
 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1af/0xc60
 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x17f/0x2e0
 handle_softirqs+0x1be/0x850
 irq_exit_rcu+0xfd/0x150
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa8/0xc0
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:bit_putcs+0x5f4/0xd80
Code: 41 89 c5 e8 7e 27 9a fc 48 89 ef 48 83 c5 01 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f8 48 89 fa 48 c1 e8 03 83 e2 07 0f b6 04 08 <38> d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 24 06 00 00 4c 89 e0 4c 89 e1 0f b6 55 ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000865f838 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880430a1822 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff8880774d8000 RDI: ffffffff8bf73a3f
RBP: ffffffff8bf73a40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: fffffbfff2107af3 R11: ffffffff9083d79f R12: ffff8880430a1fa2
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888028d06000 R15: 0000000000000000
 fbcon_putcs+0x37a/0x4b0
 do_update_region+0x2e5/0x3f0
 redraw_screen+0x62d/0x750
 complete_change_console+0x110/0x3b0
 change_console+0x1a5/0x2e0
 console_callback+0x1a1/0x4c0
 process_scheduled_works+0x5de/0x1bd0
 worker_thread+0x5a9/0xd10
 kthread+0x447/0x8a0
 ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 </TASK>

The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
 [ffffc90013b60000, ffffc90013b69000) created by:
 kernel_clone+0xea/0xee0

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x51f4d
memcg:ffff888000901b02
flags: 0x4fff00000000000(node=1|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 04fff00000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ffff888000901b02
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x2dc2(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_HIGHMEM|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_NOWARN), pid 708, tgid 708 (kworker/u19:2), ts 86243875317, free_ts 0
 prep_new_page+0x1b0/0x1e0
 get_page_from_freelist+0x1c80/0x3a40
 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x2fd/0x6d0
 alloc_pages_mpol+0x209/0x550
 alloc_pages_noprof+0x1c/0x250
 __vmalloc_node_range_noprof+0xa75/0x13a0
 __vmalloc_node_noprof+0x73/0xa0
 copy_process+0x439c/0x77f0
 kernel_clone+0xea/0xee0
 user_mode_thread+0xc5/0x110
 call_usermodehelper_exec_work+0xd0/0x180
 process_scheduled_works+0x5de/0x1bd0
 worker_thread+0x5a9/0xd10
 kthread+0x447/0x8a0
 ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
page_owner free stack trace missing

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffc90013b67500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffc90013b67580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffffc90013b67600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                   ^
 ffffc90013b67680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffc90013b67700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess):
   0:	41 89 c5             	mov    %eax,%r13d
   3:	e8 7e 27 9a fc       	callq  0xfc9a2786
   8:	48 89 ef             	mov    %rbp,%rdi
   b:	48 83 c5 01          	add    $0x1,%rbp
   f:	48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 	movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rcx
  16:	fc ff df
  19:	48 89 f8             	mov    %rdi,%rax
  1c:	48 89 fa             	mov    %rdi,%rdx
  1f:	48 c1 e8 03          	shr    $0x3,%rax
  23:	83 e2 07             	and    $0x7,%edx
  26:	0f b6 04 08          	movzbl (%rax,%rcx,1),%eax
* 2a:	38 d0                	cmp    %dl,%al <-- trapping instruction
  2c:	7f 08                	jg     0x36
  2e:	84 c0                	test   %al,%al
  30:	0f 85 24 06 00 00    	jne    0x65a
  36:	4c 89 e0             	mov    %r12,%rax
  39:	4c 89 e1             	mov    %r12,%rcx
  3c:	0f b6 55 ff          	movzbl -0x1(%rbp),%edx


thanks,
Kun Hu

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