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Message-ID: <20250522-eibrs-fix-v3-2-12704e291e1e@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 18:20:47 -0700
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To: x86@...nel.org
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/7] x86/retbleed: Simplify the =stuff checks
Simplify the nested checks, remove redundant print and comment.
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 24 ++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 53649df2c4d66c6bd3aa34dec69af9df253bccfc..94d0de3e61aec32b3b67c8d21f89a8c67b93dff3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1263,24 +1263,16 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
return;
- /*
- * retbleed=stuff is only allowed on Intel. If stuffing can't be used
- * then a different mitigation will be selected below.
- *
- * its=stuff will also attempt to enable stuffing.
- */
- if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ||
- its_mitigation == ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF) {
- if (spectre_v2_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) {
- pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n");
- retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
- } else {
- if (retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF)
- pr_info("Retbleed mitigation updated to stuffing\n");
+ /* ITS can also enable stuffing */
+ if (its_mitigation == ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF)
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
- retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
- }
+ if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF &&
+ spectre_v2_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) {
+ pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n");
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
}
+
/*
* Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
* retbleed= cmdline option except for call depth based stuffing
--
2.34.1
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