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Message-Id: <20250523043935.2009972-12-kees@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 21:39:22 -0700
From: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
Nicolas Schier <nicolas.schier@...ux.dev>,
Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>,
linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@...il.com>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@...gle.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@...gle.com>,
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Subject: [PATCH v2 12/14] kstack_erase: Support Clang stack depth tracking
Wire up CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE to Clang 21's new stack depth tracking
callback[1] option.
Link: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/SanitizerCoverage.html#tracing-stack-depth [1]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
---
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas.schier@...ux.dev>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>
Cc: <linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>
Cc: <linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org>
---
security/Kconfig.hardening | 5 ++++-
scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index f7aa2024ab25..b9a5bc3430aa 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -82,10 +82,13 @@ choice
endchoice
+config CC_HAS_SANCOV_STACK_DEPTH_CALLBACK
+ def_bool $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage-stack-depth-callback-min=1)
+
config KSTACK_ERASE
bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
depends on HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
- depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+ depends on GCC_PLUGINS || CC_HAS_SANCOV_STACK_DEPTH_CALLBACK
help
This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase b/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
index 5223d3a35817..c7bc2379e113 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ kstack-erase-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE) += -fplugin-arg-stack
DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE := -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
endif
+ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG
+kstack-erase-cflags-y += -fsanitize-coverage=stack-depth
+kstack-erase-cflags-y += -fsanitize-coverage-stack-depth-callback-min=$(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE)
+DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE := -fno-sanitize-coverage=stack-depth
+endif
+
KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS := $(kstack-erase-cflags-y)
export STACKLEAK_CFLAGS DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE
--
2.34.1
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