linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/3] BPF signature verification

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Message-ID: <CACYkzJ5gXf4MOdb4scid0TaQwpwewH5Zzn2W18XB1tFBoR2CQQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 31 May 2025 01:32:18 +0200
From: KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>
To: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@...ux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, jarkko@...nel.org, zeffron@...tgames.com, 
	xiyou.wangcong@...il.com, kysrinivasan@...il.com, code@...icks.com, 
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, roberto.sassu@...wei.com, 
	James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, 
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>, 
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>, 
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>, Song Liu <song@...nel.org>, 
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>, Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>, Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, 
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Lukas Wunner <lukas@...ner.de>, 
	Ignat Korchagin <ignat@...udflare.com>, Quentin Monnet <qmo@...nel.org>, 
	Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@...il.com>, Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>, 
	Anton Protopopov <aspsk@...valent.com>, Jordan Rome <linux@...danrome.com>, 
	Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@...wdstrike.com>, Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@...cle.com>, 
	Matteo Croce <teknoraver@...a.com>, bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, kys@...rosoft.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] BPF signature verification

> And I'm saying that they are, based on wanting visibility in the LSM
> layer, passing that along to the end user, and wanting to be able to
> show correctness, along with mitigating an entire vector of supply chain
> attacks targeting gen.c.

What supply chain attack?I asked this earlier, you never replied, what
does a supply chain attack here really look like?


- KP

>
> So in summary, your objection to this is that you feel it's simply "not
> needed", and those above risks/design problems aren't actually an issue?
>
> > Let's have this discussion in the patch series, much easier to discuss
> > with the code.
>
> I think we've all been waiting for that. Yes, lets.