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Message-ID: <aD_8z4pd7JcFkAwX@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2025 10:59:11 +0300
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
To: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>
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Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: Provide function that allocates a secure
anonymous inode
(added Paul Moore for selinux bits)
On Mon, Jun 02, 2025 at 12:17:54PM -0700, Ackerley Tng wrote:
> The new function, alloc_anon_secure_inode(), returns an inode after
> running checks in security_inode_init_security_anon().
>
> Also refactor secretmem's file creation process to use the new
> function.
>
> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>
> ---
> fs/anon_inodes.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
> include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
> mm/secretmem.c | 9 +--------
> 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/anon_inodes.c b/fs/anon_inodes.c
> index 583ac81669c2..4c3110378647 100644
> --- a/fs/anon_inodes.c
> +++ b/fs/anon_inodes.c
> @@ -55,17 +55,20 @@ static struct file_system_type anon_inode_fs_type = {
> .kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
> };
>
> -static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(
> - const char *name,
> - const struct inode *context_inode)
> +static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(struct super_block *s,
> + const char *name, const struct inode *context_inode,
> + bool fs_internal)
> {
> struct inode *inode;
> int error;
>
> - inode = alloc_anon_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb);
> + inode = alloc_anon_inode(s);
> if (IS_ERR(inode))
> return inode;
> - inode->i_flags &= ~S_PRIVATE;
> +
> + if (!fs_internal)
> + inode->i_flags &= ~S_PRIVATE;
> +
> error = security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &QSTR(name),
> context_inode);
> if (error) {
> @@ -75,6 +78,12 @@ static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(
> return inode;
> }
>
> +struct inode *alloc_anon_secure_inode(struct super_block *s, const char *name)
> +{
> + return anon_inode_make_secure_inode(s, name, NULL, true);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alloc_anon_secure_inode);
> +
> static struct file *__anon_inode_getfile(const char *name,
> const struct file_operations *fops,
> void *priv, int flags,
> @@ -88,7 +97,8 @@ static struct file *__anon_inode_getfile(const char *name,
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
>
> if (make_inode) {
> - inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(name, context_inode);
> + inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb,
> + name, context_inode, false);
> if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
> file = ERR_CAST(inode);
> goto err;
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index 016b0fe1536e..0fded2e3c661 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -3550,6 +3550,7 @@ extern int simple_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
> extern const struct address_space_operations ram_aops;
> extern int always_delete_dentry(const struct dentry *);
> extern struct inode *alloc_anon_inode(struct super_block *);
> +extern struct inode *alloc_anon_secure_inode(struct super_block *, const char *);
> extern int simple_nosetlease(struct file *, int, struct file_lease **, void **);
> extern const struct dentry_operations simple_dentry_operations;
>
> diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
> index 1b0a214ee558..c0e459e58cb6 100644
> --- a/mm/secretmem.c
> +++ b/mm/secretmem.c
> @@ -195,18 +195,11 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
> struct file *file;
> struct inode *inode;
> const char *anon_name = "[secretmem]";
> - int err;
>
> - inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb);
> + inode = alloc_anon_secure_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb, anon_name);
> if (IS_ERR(inode))
> return ERR_CAST(inode);
I don't think we should not hide secretmem and guest_memfd inodes from
selinux, so clearing S_PRIVATE for them is not needed and you can just drop
fs_internal parameter in anon_inode_make_secure_inode()
>
> - err = security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &QSTR(anon_name), NULL);
> - if (err) {
> - file = ERR_PTR(err);
> - goto err_free_inode;
> - }
> -
> file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
> O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops);
> if (IS_ERR(file))
> --
> 2.49.0.1204.g71687c7c1d-goog
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
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