[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20250611190010.28440A1e-hca@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 21:00:10 +0200
From: Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@...ras.ru>
Cc: Harald Freudenberger <freude@...ux.ibm.com>,
Holger Dengler <dengler@...ux.ibm.com>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@...ux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@...ux.ibm.com>, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, lvc-project@...uxtesting.org,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] s390/pkey: prevent overflow in size calculation for
memdup_user()
On Wed, Jun 11, 2025 at 08:21:15PM +0300, Fedor Pchelkin wrote:
> Number of apqn target list entries contained in 'nr_apqns' variable is
> determined by userspace via an ioctl call so the result of the product in
> calculation of size passed to memdup_user() may overflow.
>
> In this case the actual size of the allocated area and the value
> describing it won't be in sync leading to various types of unpredictable
> behaviour later.
>
> Return an error if an overflow is detected. Note that it is different
> from when nr_apqns is zero - that case is considered valid and should be
> handled in subsequent pkey_handler implementations.
>
> Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
>
> Fixes: f2bbc96e7cfa ("s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@...ras.ru>
> ---
> drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c | 7 ++++++-
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c
> index cef60770f68b..a731fc9c62a7 100644
> --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c
> +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c
> @@ -83,10 +83,15 @@ static void *_copy_key_from_user(void __user *ukey, size_t keylen)
>
> static void *_copy_apqns_from_user(void __user *uapqns, size_t nr_apqns)
> {
> + size_t size;
> +
> if (!uapqns || nr_apqns == 0)
> return NULL;
>
> - return memdup_user(uapqns, nr_apqns * sizeof(struct pkey_apqn));
> + if (check_mul_overflow(nr_apqns, sizeof(struct pkey_apqn), &size))
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> + return memdup_user(uapqns, size);
Thanks! Is there any specific reason why this is open-coding
memdup_array_user()?
If not, please send a new version which does the simple conversion.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists