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Message-ID: <CAHk-=wgYdf08uju5UrDZ9kEgsC9yrtBNOTzSX6zAbOdRfg+JkA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 08:43:02 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>,
Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Lukas Wunner <lukas@...ner.de>,
Ignat Korchagin <ignat@...udflare.com>, Clemens Lang <cllang@...hat.com>,
David Bohannon <dbohanno@...hat.com>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Module signing and post-quantum crypto public key algorithms
On Fri, 13 Jun 2025 at 07:54, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> So we need to do something about the impending quantum-related obsolescence [..]
I'd suggest you worry more about the rumors that Kazakhstan is growing
a veritable army of gerbils, and giving them all ABACUSES!
What's your plan for that imminent attack vector? Because they could
be here any day.
Yes, yes, please stop using RSA and relying over-much on big prime
numbers. But let's not throw the "Post Quantum" word around as if it
was reality.
The reality of kernel security remains actual bugs - both in hardware
and in software - not some buzzword.
Linus
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