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Message-ID: <20250615151333.10644-2-minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2025 22:13:32 +0700
From: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@...il.com>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
	Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
	Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@...ux.alibaba.com>,
	Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@...hat.com>,
	Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@...n.ch>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@...nel.org>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	virtualization@...ts.linux.dev,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	bpf@...r.kernel.org,
	Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH net 1/2] virtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame's length check

When calling buf_to_xdp, the len argument is the frame data's length
without virtio header's length (vi->hdr_len). We check that len with

	xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len

to ensure the provided len does not larger than the allocated chunk
size. The additional vi->hdr_len is because in virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk,
we use part of XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM for virtio header and ask the vhost
to start placing data from

	hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - vi->hdr_len
not
	hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM

But the first buffer has virtio_header, so the maximum frame's length in
the first buffer can only be

	xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size()
not
	xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len

like in the current check.

This commit adds an additional argument to buf_to_xdp differentiate
between the first buffer and other ones to correctly calculate the maximum
frame's length.

Fixes: a4e7ba702701 ("virtio_net: xsk: rx: support recv small mode")
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@...il.com>
---
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
index e53ba600605a..7c9cf5ed1827 100644
--- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
+++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
@@ -1127,15 +1127,37 @@ static void check_sq_full_and_disable(struct virtnet_info *vi,
 	}
 }
 
+/**
+ * buf_to_xdp() - convert the @buf context to xdp_buff
+ * @vi: virtnet_info struct
+ * @rq: the receive queue struct
+ * @buf: the xdp_buff pointer that is passed to virtqueue_add_inbuf_premapped in
+ *       virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk
+ * @len: the length of received data without virtio header's length
+ * @first_buf: this buffer is the first one or not
+ */
 static struct xdp_buff *buf_to_xdp(struct virtnet_info *vi,
-				   struct receive_queue *rq, void *buf, u32 len)
+				   struct receive_queue *rq, void *buf,
+				   u32 len, bool first_buf)
 {
 	struct xdp_buff *xdp;
 	u32 bufsize;
 
 	xdp = (struct xdp_buff *)buf;
 
-	bufsize = xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size(rq->xsk_pool) + vi->hdr_len;
+	/* In virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk, we use part of XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM for
+	 * virtio header and ask the vhost to fill data from
+	 *         hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - vi->hdr_len
+	 * The first buffer has virtio header so the remaining region for frame
+	 * data is
+	 *         xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size()
+	 * While other buffers than the first one do not have virtio header, so
+	 * the maximum frame data's length can be
+	 *         xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len
+	 */
+	bufsize = xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size(rq->xsk_pool);
+	if (!first_buf)
+		bufsize += vi->hdr_len;
 
 	if (unlikely(len > bufsize)) {
 		pr_debug("%s: rx error: len %u exceeds truesize %u\n",
@@ -1260,7 +1282,7 @@ static int xsk_append_merge_buffer(struct virtnet_info *vi,
 
 		u64_stats_add(&stats->bytes, len);
 
-		xdp = buf_to_xdp(vi, rq, buf, len);
+		xdp = buf_to_xdp(vi, rq, buf, len, false);
 		if (!xdp)
 			goto err;
 
@@ -1358,7 +1380,7 @@ static void virtnet_receive_xsk_buf(struct virtnet_info *vi, struct receive_queu
 
 	u64_stats_add(&stats->bytes, len);
 
-	xdp = buf_to_xdp(vi, rq, buf, len);
+	xdp = buf_to_xdp(vi, rq, buf, len, true);
 	if (!xdp)
 		return;
 
-- 
2.43.0


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