linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x86/startup: Let the caller retrieve encryption mask

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20250616153111.GAaFA4v85VGWp9qIrY@fat_crate.local>
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 17:31:11 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Khalid Ali <khaliidcaliy@...il.com>
Cc: tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
	x86@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/startup: Let the caller retrieve encryption mask

On Mon, Jun 16, 2025 at 12:34:13PM +0000, Khalid Ali wrote:
> From: Khalid Ali <khaliidcaliy@...il.com>
> 
> Don't return encryption mask . This makes __startup_64() to handle
> doing the actual work including encrypting the kernel. The caller has
> already access to encryption mask and can directly retrieve it. On C
> code, the caller can call sme_get_me_mask() and include /arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> directly while on assembly functions like startup_64 the "sme_me_mask"
> is directly accessible to them if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is set. This
> also makes consistent with the way secondary_startup_64_no_verify label
> is handled. On intel CPUs this is not even neccessary, so we should
> retrieve the mask only if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is set.

What Thomas told you about structuring commit messages:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/875xgziprs.ffs@tglx

Do it please and then send patches.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette