linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 08/21] KVM: TDX: Increase/decrease folio ref for huge pages

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Message-ID: <b7c62e054a72fce9c43a21201e9b9d1d42d5b9f7.camel@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 23:27:49 +0000
From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: "ackerleytng@...gle.com" <ackerleytng@...gle.com>, "Zhao, Yan Y"
	<yan.y.zhao@...el.com>
CC: "quic_eberman@...cinc.com" <quic_eberman@...cinc.com>, "Shutemov, Kirill"
	<kirill.shutemov@...el.com>, "Li, Xiaoyao" <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>,
	"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, "Hansen, Dave"
	<dave.hansen@...el.com>, "david@...hat.com" <david@...hat.com>,
	"thomas.lendacky@....com" <thomas.lendacky@....com>, "tabba@...gle.com"
	<tabba@...gle.com>, "vbabka@...e.cz" <vbabka@...e.cz>, "Du, Fan"
	<fan.du@...el.com>, "michael.roth@....com" <michael.roth@....com>,
	"seanjc@...gle.com" <seanjc@...gle.com>, "Weiny, Ira" <ira.weiny@...el.com>,
	"pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>, "binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com"
	<binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>, "Li, Zhiquan1" <zhiquan1.li@...el.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "Yamahata,
 Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>, "Peng, Chao P" <chao.p.peng@...el.com>,
	"Annapurve, Vishal" <vannapurve@...gle.com>, "jroedel@...e.de"
	<jroedel@...e.de>, "Miao, Jun" <jun.miao@...el.com>, "pgonda@...gle.com"
	<pgonda@...gle.com>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 08/21] KVM: TDX: Increase/decrease folio ref for huge
 pages

On Mon, 2025-06-16 at 18:43 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > It is true that a buggy or malicious userspace VMM can ignore conversion
> > failures and report success to the guest, but if both the userspace VMM
> > and guest are malicious, it's quite hard for the kernel to defend
> > against that.

For upstream, it's going to be required that userspace can't mess up the host
kernel. Userspace is free to mess up the guest though.