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Message-ID: <202506171012.Ji3c5sJh-lkp@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 10:48:45 +0800
From: kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>
To: Khalid Ali <khaliidcaliy@...il.com>, tglx@...utronix.de,
mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
x86@...nel.org
Cc: llvm@...ts.linux.dev, oe-kbuild-all@...ts.linux.dev, hpa@...or.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Khalid Ali <khaliidcaliy@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/startup: Let the caller retrieve encryption mask
Hi Khalid,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on tip/x86/core]
[also build test WARNING on tip/master linus/master v6.16-rc2 next-20250616]
[cannot apply to tip/auto-latest]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Khalid-Ali/x86-startup-Let-the-caller-retrieve-encryption-mask/20250616-204024
base: tip/x86/core
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250616123605.927-1-khaliidcaliy%40gmail.com
patch subject: [PATCH] x86/startup: Let the caller retrieve encryption mask
config: x86_64-buildonly-randconfig-001-20250617 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20250617/202506171012.Ji3c5sJh-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 20.1.2 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 58df0ef89dd64126512e4ee27b4ac3fd8ddf6247)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20250617/202506171012.Ji3c5sJh-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202506171012.Ji3c5sJh-lkp@intel.com/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:114:2: warning: '/*' within block comment [-Wcomment]
114 | /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
| ^
1 warning generated.
vim +114 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
bcce829083339b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Michael Roth 2022-02-09 96
04633df0c43d71 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov 2015-11-05 97 /* Sanitize CPU configuration */
04633df0c43d71 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov 2015-11-05 98 call verify_cpu
04633df0c43d71 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov 2015-11-05 99
093562198e1a63 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-12-05 100 /*
093562198e1a63 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-12-05 101 * Derive the kernel's physical-to-virtual offset from the physical and
093562198e1a63 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-12-05 102 * virtual addresses of common_startup_64().
093562198e1a63 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-12-05 103 */
093562198e1a63 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-12-05 104 leaq common_startup_64(%rip), %rdi
093562198e1a63 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-12-05 105 subq .Lcommon_startup_64(%rip), %rdi
093562198e1a63 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-12-05 106
5868f3651fa0df arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 107 /*
5868f3651fa0df arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 108 * Perform pagetable fixups. Additionally, if SME is active, encrypt
8b4b3620a6b25c arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Khalid Ali 2025-06-16 109 * the kernel.
8b4b3620a6b25c arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Khalid Ali 2025-06-16 110 /
2f69a81ad68732 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2023-08-07 111 movq %r15, %rsi
c88d71508e36b5 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Kirill A. Shutemov 2017-06-06 112 call __startup_64
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 113
5868f3651fa0df arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 @114 /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
8b4b3620a6b25c arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Khalid Ali 2025-06-16 115 leaq early_top_pgt(%rip), %rax
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 116)
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 117) #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
8b4b3620a6b25c arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Khalid Ali 2025-06-16 118 addq sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 119) mov %rax, %rdi
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 120)
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 121) /*
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 122) * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 123) * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 124) * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 125) * the next RET instruction.
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 126) */
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 127) call sev_verify_cbit
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 128) #endif
30579c8baa5b4b arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-11-30 129)
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 130 /*
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 131 * Switch to early_top_pgt which still has the identity mappings
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 132 * present.
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 133 */
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 134 movq %rax, %cr3
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 135
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 136 /* Branch to the common startup code at its kernel virtual address */
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 137 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
093562198e1a63 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-12-05 138 jmp *.Lcommon_startup_64(%rip)
37818afd15fe72 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Jiri Slaby 2019-10-11 139 SYM_CODE_END(startup_64)
37818afd15fe72 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Jiri Slaby 2019-10-11 140
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 141 __INITRODATA
093562198e1a63 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-12-05 142 SYM_DATA_LOCAL(.Lcommon_startup_64, .quad common_startup_64)
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 143
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 144 .text
bc7b11c04ee9c9 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Jiri Slaby 2019-10-11 145 SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
fb799447ae2974 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Josh Poimboeuf 2023-03-01 146 UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
3e3f069504344c arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Peter Zijlstra 2022-03-08 147 ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
1ab60e0f72f71e arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Vivek Goyal 2007-05-02 148 /*
1256276c98dbcf arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2013-02-25 149 * At this point the CPU runs in 64bit mode CS.L = 1 CS.D = 0,
1ab60e0f72f71e arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Vivek Goyal 2007-05-02 150 * and someone has loaded a mapped page table.
1ab60e0f72f71e arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Vivek Goyal 2007-05-02 151 *
1ab60e0f72f71e arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Vivek Goyal 2007-05-02 152 * We come here either from startup_64 (using physical addresses)
1ab60e0f72f71e arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Vivek Goyal 2007-05-02 153 * or from trampoline.S (using virtual addresses).
1ab60e0f72f71e arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Vivek Goyal 2007-05-02 154 *
1ab60e0f72f71e arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Vivek Goyal 2007-05-02 155 * Using virtual addresses from trampoline.S removes the need
1ab60e0f72f71e arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Vivek Goyal 2007-05-02 156 * to have any identity mapped pages in the kernel page table
1ab60e0f72f71e arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Vivek Goyal 2007-05-02 157 * after the boot processor executes this code.
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 158 */
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/x86_64/kernel/head.S Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 159
04633df0c43d71 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov 2015-11-05 160 /* Sanitize CPU configuration */
04633df0c43d71 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov 2015-11-05 161 call verify_cpu
04633df0c43d71 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Borislav Petkov 2015-11-05 162
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 163 /*
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 164 * The secondary_startup_64_no_verify entry point is only used by
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 165 * SEV-ES guests. In those guests the call to verify_cpu() would cause
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 166 * #VC exceptions which can not be handled at this stage of secondary
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 167 * CPU bringup.
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 168 *
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 169 * All non SEV-ES systems, especially Intel systems, need to execute
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 170 * verify_cpu() above to make sure NX is enabled.
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 171 */
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 172 SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
fb799447ae2974 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Josh Poimboeuf 2023-03-01 173 UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
3e3f069504344c arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Peter Zijlstra 2022-03-08 174 ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
3ecacdbd23956a arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Joerg Roedel 2020-09-07 175
2f69a81ad68732 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2023-08-07 176 /* Clear %R15 which holds the boot_params pointer on the boot CPU */
721f791ce1cddf arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Uros Bizjak 2024-01-24 177 xorl %r15d, %r15d
2f69a81ad68732 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2023-08-07 178
d6a41f184dcea0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 179 /* Derive the runtime physical address of init_top_pgt[] */
d6a41f184dcea0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 180 movq phys_base(%rip), %rax
d6a41f184dcea0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 181 addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
d6a41f184dcea0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 182
5868f3651fa0df arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 183 /*
5868f3651fa0df arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 184 * Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be
5868f3651fa0df arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 185 * added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3.
5868f3651fa0df arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 186 */
469693d8f62299 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Michael Roth 2022-02-09 187 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
d6a41f184dcea0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 188 addq sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax
469693d8f62299 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Michael Roth 2022-02-09 189 #endif
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 190 /*
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 191 * Switch to the init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 192 * unmap the identity mapped ranges.
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 193 */
828263957611c2 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-27 194 movq %rax, %cr3
5868f3651fa0df arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 195
--
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