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Message-ID: <CAHYQsXR43MGM826eHtEkmH4X2bM-amM29A38XUj+hMbNF2vDJQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 11:01:40 +0800
From: Danis Jiang <danisjiang@...il.com>
To: asmadeus@...ewreck.org
Cc: ericvh@...nel.org, lucho@...kov.net, linux_oss@...debyte.com,
v9fs@...ts.linux.dev, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, security@...nel.org,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer
On Tue, Jun 17, 2025 at 7:00 AM <asmadeus@...ewreck.org> wrote:
>
> Yuhao Jiang wrote on Mon, Jun 16, 2025 at 09:25:39PM +0800:
> > A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the USB 9pfs transport layer
> > where inconsistent size validation between packet header parsing and
> > actual data copying allows a malicious USB host to overflow heap buffers.
> >
> > The issue occurs because:
> > - usb9pfs_rx_header() validates only the declared size in packet header
> > - usb9pfs_rx_complete() uses req->actual (actual received bytes) for memcpy
> >
> > This allows an attacker to craft packets with small declared size (bypassing
> > validation) but large actual payload (triggering overflow in memcpy).
> >
> > Add validation in usb9pfs_rx_complete() to ensure req->actual does not
> > exceed the buffer capacity before copying data.
>
> Thanks for this check!
>
> Did you reproduce this or was this static analysis found?
> (to knowi if you tested wrt question below)
I found this by static analysis.
>
> > Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@...il.com>
> > Fixes: a3be076dc174 ("net/9p/usbg: Add new usb gadget function transport")
> > Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@...il.com>
> > ---
> > net/9p/trans_usbg.c | 9 +++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/9p/trans_usbg.c b/net/9p/trans_usbg.c
> > index 6b694f117aef..047a2862fc84 100644
> > --- a/net/9p/trans_usbg.c
> > +++ b/net/9p/trans_usbg.c
> > @@ -242,6 +242,15 @@ static void usb9pfs_rx_complete(struct usb_ep *ep, struct usb_request *req)
> > if (!p9_rx_req)
> > return;
> >
> > + /* Validate actual received size against buffer capacity */
> > + if (req->actual > p9_rx_req->rc.capacity) {
> > + dev_err(&cdev->gadget->dev,
> > + "received data size %u exceeds buffer capacity %zu\n",
> > + req->actual, p9_rx_req->rc.capacity);
> > + p9_req_put(usb9pfs->client, p9_rx_req);
>
> I still haven't gotten around to setting up something to test this, and
> even less the error case, but I'm not sure a single put is enough --
> p9_client_cb does another put.
> Conceptually I think it's better to mark the error and move on
> e.g. (not even compile tested)
> ```
> int status = REQ_STATUS_RCVD;
>
> [...]
>
> if (req->actual > p9_rx_req->rc.capacity) {
> dev_err(...)
> req->actual = 0;
> status = REQ_STATUS_ERROR;
> }
>
> memcpy(..)
>
> p9_rx_req->rc.size = req->actual;
>
> p9_client_cb(usb9pfs->client, p9_rx_req, status);
> p9_req_put(usb9pfs->client, p9_rx_req);
>
> complete(&usb9pfs->received);
> ```
> (I'm not sure overriding req->actual is allowed, might be safer to use
> an intermediate variable like status instead)
>
> What do you think?
>
> Thanks,
> --
> Dominique Martinet | Asmadeus
Yes, I think your patch is better, my initial patch forgot p9_client_cb.
Thanks,
Yuhao Jiang
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