lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20250622-toicsti-bug-v1-2-f374373b04b2@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2025 19:41:08 -0600
From: Abhinav Saxena via B4 Relay <devnull+xandfury.gmail.com@...nel.org>
To: Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>, 
 Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@...il.com>, 
 Bill Wendling <morbo@...gle.com>, Justin Stitt <justinstitt@...gle.com>, 
 Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, 
 Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>, 
 Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, 
 llvm@...ts.linux.dev, selinux@...r.kernel.org, 
 Abhinav Saxena <xandfury@...il.com>, kees@...nel.org, 
 linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] selinux: add capability checks for TIOCSTI ioctl

From: Abhinav Saxena <xandfury@...il.com>

The TIOCSTI ioctl currently only checks the current process's
credentials, creating a TOCTOU vulnerability where an unprivileged
process can open a TTY fd and pass it to a privileged process via
SCM_RIGHTS.

Fix by requiring BOTH the file opener (file->f_cred) AND the current
process to have CAP_SYS_ADMIN. This prevents privilege escalation
while ensuring legitimate use cases continue to work.

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/156

Signed-off-by: Abhinav Saxena <xandfury@...il.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 595ceb314aeb..a628551873ab 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3847,6 +3847,12 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 					    CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
 		break;
 
+	case TIOCSTI:
+		if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+		    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			error = -EPERM;
+		break;
+
 	case FIOCLEX:
 	case FIONCLEX:
 		if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())

-- 
2.43.0



Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ