[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <ff2662ca-3b86-425b-97f8-3883f1018e83@csgroup.eu>
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 07:27:47 +0200
From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>
To: David Laight <david.laight.linux@...il.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, Nicholas Piggin
<npiggin@...il.com>, Naveen N Rao <naveen@...nel.org>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@...ux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Darren Hart <dvhart@...radead.org>,
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@...olabs.net>, Andre Almeida <andrealmeid@...lia.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] powerpc: Implement masked user access
Le 22/06/2025 à 18:20, David Laight a écrit :
> On Sun, 22 Jun 2025 11:52:38 +0200
> Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu> wrote:
>
>> Masked user access avoids the address/size verification by access_ok().
>> Allthough its main purpose is to skip the speculation in the
>> verification of user address and size hence avoid the need of spec
>> mitigation, it also has the advantage to reduce the amount of
>> instructions needed so it also benefits to platforms that don't
>> need speculation mitigation, especially when the size of the copy is
>> not know at build time.
>
> It also removes a conditional branch that is quite likely to be
> statically predicted 'the wrong way'.
But include/asm-generic/access_ok.h defines access_ok() as:
#define access_ok(addr, size) likely(__access_ok(addr, size))
So GCC uses the 'unlikely' variant of the branch instruction to force
the correct prediction, doesn't it ?
>
>> Unlike x86_64 which masks the address to 'all bits set' when the
>> user address is invalid, here the address is set to an address in
>> the gap. It avoids relying on the zero page to catch offseted
>> accesses. On book3s/32 it makes sure the opening remains on user
>> segment. The overcost is a single instruction in the masking.
>
> That isn't true (any more).
> Linus changed the check to (approx):
> if (uaddr > TASK_SIZE)
> uaddr = TASK_SIZE;
> (Implemented with a conditional move)
Ah ok, I overlooked that, I didn't know the cmove instruction, seem
similar to the isel instruction on powerpc e500.
Christophe
Powered by blists - more mailing lists