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Message-ID: <aFu2CKWt+IazDiiz@yilunxu-OptiPlex-7050>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 16:40:40 +0800
From: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@...ux.intel.com>
To: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...nel.org>
Cc: jgg@...dia.com, jgg@...pe.ca, kevin.tian@...el.com, will@...nel.org,
	iommu@...ts.linux.dev, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	joro@...tes.org, robin.murphy@....com, shuah@...nel.org,
	nicolinc@...dia.com, aik@....com, dan.j.williams@...el.com,
	baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com, yilun.xu@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] iommufd: Add iommufd_object_tombstone_user()
 helper

On Wed, Jun 25, 2025 at 11:21:15AM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@...ux.intel.com> writes:
> 
> > Add the iommufd_object_tombstone_user() helper, which allows the caller
> > to destroy an iommufd object created by userspace.
> >
> > This is useful on some destroy paths when the kernel caller finds the
> > object should have been removed by userspace but is still alive. With
> > this helper, the caller destroys the object but leave the object ID
> > reserved (so called tombstone). The tombstone prevents repurposing the
> > object ID without awareness from the original user.
> >
> > Since this happens for abnomal userspace behavior, for simplicity, the
> > tombstoned object ID would be permanently leaked until
> > iommufd_fops_release(). I.e. the original user gets an error when
> > calling ioctl(IOMMU_DESTROY) on that ID.
> >
> > The first use case would be to ensure the iommufd_vdevice can't outlive
> > the associated iommufd_device.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@...ux.intel.com>
> > ---
> >  drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++-
> >  drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c            | 31 ++++++++++++++++++-------
> >  2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h
> > index 9ccc83341f32..fbc9ef78d81f 100644
> > --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h
> > +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h
> > @@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ void iommufd_object_finalize(struct iommufd_ctx *ictx,
> >  			     struct iommufd_object *obj);
> >  
> >  enum {
> > -	REMOVE_WAIT_SHORTTERM = 1,
> > +	REMOVE_WAIT_SHORTTERM	= BIT(0),
> > +	REMOVE_OBJ_TOMBSTONE	= BIT(1),
> >  };
> >  int iommufd_object_remove(struct iommufd_ctx *ictx,
> >  			  struct iommufd_object *to_destroy, u32 id,
> > @@ -213,6 +214,26 @@ static inline void iommufd_object_destroy_user(struct iommufd_ctx *ictx,
> >  	WARN_ON(ret);
> >  }
> >  
> > +/*
> > + * Similar to iommufd_object_destroy_user(), except that the object ID is left
> > + * reserved/tombstoned.
> > + */
> > +static inline void iommufd_object_tombstone_user(struct iommufd_ctx *ictx,
> > +						 struct iommufd_object *obj)
> > +{
> > +	int ret;
> > +
> > +	ret = iommufd_object_remove(ictx, obj, obj->id,
> > +				    REMOVE_WAIT_SHORTTERM | REMOVE_OBJ_TOMBSTONE);
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * If there is a bug and we couldn't destroy the object then we did put
> > +	 * back the caller's users refcount and will eventually try to free it
> > +	 * again during close.
> > +	 */
> > +	WARN_ON(ret);
> > +}
> > +
> >  /*
> >   * The HWPT allocated by autodomains is used in possibly many devices and
> >   * is automatically destroyed when its refcount reaches zero.
> > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c
> > index 3df468f64e7d..5fd75aba068b 100644
> > --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c
> > +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c
> > @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int iommufd_object_remove(struct iommufd_ctx *ictx,
> >  		goto err_xa;
> >  	}
> >  
> > -	xas_store(&xas, NULL);
> > +	xas_store(&xas, (flags & REMOVE_OBJ_TOMBSTONE) ? XA_ZERO_ENTRY : NULL);
> >  	if (ictx->vfio_ioas == container_of(obj, struct iommufd_ioas, obj))
> >  		ictx->vfio_ioas = NULL;
> >  	xa_unlock(&ictx->objects);
> > @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static int iommufd_fops_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
> >  	struct iommufd_ctx *ictx = filp->private_data;
> >  	struct iommufd_sw_msi_map *next;
> >  	struct iommufd_sw_msi_map *cur;
> > +	XA_STATE(xas, &ictx->objects, 0);
> >  	struct iommufd_object *obj;
> >  
> >  	/*
> > @@ -251,16 +252,30 @@ static int iommufd_fops_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
> >  	 */
> >  	while (!xa_empty(&ictx->objects)) {
> >  		unsigned int destroyed = 0;
> > -		unsigned long index;
> >  
> > -		xa_for_each(&ictx->objects, index, obj) {
> > -			if (!refcount_dec_if_one(&obj->users))
> > -				continue;
> > +		xas_set(&xas, 0);
> > +		for (;;) {
> > +			rcu_read_lock();
> > +			obj = xas_find(&xas, ULONG_MAX);
> > +			rcu_read_unlock();
> >
> 
> What is the need for the rcu_read_lock()? 

To surpress rcu warning in xas_find().

> 
> > +
> > +			if (!obj)
> > +				break;
> > +
> > +			if (!xa_is_zero(obj)) {
> > +				if (!refcount_dec_if_one(&obj->users))
> > +					continue;
> > +
> > +				iommufd_object_ops[obj->type].destroy(obj);
> > +				kfree(obj);
> > +			}
> > +
> >  			destroyed++;
> > -			xa_erase(&ictx->objects, index);
> > -			iommufd_object_ops[obj->type].destroy(obj);
> > -			kfree(obj);
> > +			xas_lock(&xas);
> > +			xas_store(&xas, NULL);
> > +			xas_unlock(&xas);
> 
> is that xas_lock needed?. we can't run a xarray update parallel to this
> because neither iommufd ioctl not vfio cdev unbind can happen in parallel.

That's true, but also to surpress warning in xas_store().

> 
> I have this as an additonal comment added to the function in my change.
> 
> /*
>  * We don't need additional locks because the iommufd_fops_release() function is
>  * only triggered when the iommufd descriptor is released. At that point, no
>  * other iommufd-based ioctl operations can be running concurrently.
>  *
>  * The destruction of the vdevice via idevice unbind is also safe:
>  * iommufd_fops_release() can only be called after the idevice has been unbound.
>  * The idevice bind operation takes a reference to the iommufd descriptor,
>  * preventing early release.
>  */

That's good. But Jason has another suggestion that no need to clear
tombstones on fops_release(), so we don't need these changes at all.

Thanks,
Yilun

> 
> 
> >  		}
> > +
> >  		/* Bug related to users refcount */
> >  		if (WARN_ON(!destroyed))
> >  			break;
> > -- 
> > 2.25.1
> 
> -aneesh

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