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Message-ID: <295f94d4-f5e2-4849-ab62-9fdc75722e20@suse.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 18:13:05 +0300
From: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/bugs: Remove 'force' options for retbleed/ITS
On 6/26/25 17:40, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 26, 2025 at 09:27:03AM -0500, David Kaplan wrote:
>> Command line options which force-enable a mitigation on an unaffected
>> processor provide arguably no security value but do create the potential
>> for problems due to the increased set of mitigation interactions.
>>
>> For example, setting "indirect_target_selection=force" on an AMD
>> Retbleed-affected CPU (e.g., Zen2) results in a configuration where the
>> kernel reports that both ITS and Retbleed are mitigated, but Retbleed is
>> not in fact mitigated. In this configuration, untraining of the retbleed
>> return thunk is enabled but the its_return_thunk is active, rendering the
>> untraining ineffective.
>>
>> It is wrong for the kernel to report that a bug is mitigated when it is
>> not. While this specific interaction could be directly fixed, the ability
>> to force-enable these bugs creates unneeded complexity, so remove it.
>>
>> If removing these options entirely is unacceptable, perhaps for
>> compatibility reasons, another option could be to only allow forcing on the
>> affected vendor (i.e., only allow forcing ITS on Intel CPUs), which would
>> at least limit the potential interactions that need to be analyzed.
>> Tagging as RFC to prompt discussion on this point.
>
> Testing; I use these things for testing. Makes I don't have to run on
> affected hardware, I can just force the feature on and inspect the code
> and ensures it runs.
>
> If you use force, you get to keep all pieces -- no warranties.
I concur, however using force won't always guarantee that the code runs
though, because there can be other condition that must/must not be met
i.e trying to run ITS on AMD hw (yeah, yeah I know :) ) also required
commenting out some checks in patch_retpoline.
>
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