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Message-Id: <20250626153147.145312-12-snovitoll@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 20:31:47 +0500
From: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@...il.com>
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Subject: [PATCH v2 11/11] kasan: replace kasan_arch_is_ready with kasan_enabled
Replace the existing kasan_arch_is_ready() calls with kasan_enabled().
Drop checks where the caller is already under kasan_enabled() condition.
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218315
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@...il.com>
---
include/linux/kasan-enabled.h | 20 ++++++++++++--------
mm/kasan/common.c | 8 ++++----
mm/kasan/generic.c | 6 +++---
mm/kasan/kasan.h | 6 ------
mm/kasan/shadow.c | 15 +++------------
5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan-enabled.h b/include/linux/kasan-enabled.h
index 2b1351c30c6..2436eb45cfe 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan-enabled.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan-enabled.h
@@ -5,32 +5,36 @@
#include <linux/static_key.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+
/*
* Global runtime flag. Starts ‘false’; switched to ‘true’ by
* the appropriate kasan_init_*() once KASAN is fully initialized.
*/
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_flag_enabled);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
static __always_inline bool kasan_enabled(void)
{
return static_branch_likely(&kasan_flag_enabled);
}
-static inline bool kasan_hw_tags_enabled(void)
+#else /* !CONFIG_KASAN */
+
+static __always_inline bool kasan_enabled(void)
{
- return kasan_enabled();
+ return false;
}
-#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
-static inline bool kasan_enabled(void)
+static inline bool kasan_hw_tags_enabled(void)
{
- return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN);
+ return kasan_enabled();
}
+#else /* !CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
static inline bool kasan_hw_tags_enabled(void)
{
return false;
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 525194da25f..0f3648335a6 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static inline void poison_slab_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
bool __kasan_slab_pre_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
unsigned long ip)
{
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready() || is_kfence_address(object))
+ if (!kasan_enabled() || is_kfence_address(object))
return false;
return check_slab_allocation(cache, object, ip);
}
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ bool __kasan_slab_pre_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, bool init,
bool still_accessible)
{
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready() || is_kfence_address(object))
+ if (!kasan_enabled() || is_kfence_address(object))
return false;
poison_slab_object(cache, object, init, still_accessible);
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, bool init,
static inline bool check_page_allocation(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
{
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+ if (!kasan_enabled())
return false;
if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr))) {
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ bool __kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
return true;
}
- if (is_kfence_address(ptr) || !kasan_arch_is_ready())
+ if (is_kfence_address(ptr) || !kasan_enabled())
return true;
slab = folio_slab(folio);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index ab9ab30caf4..af2f2077a45 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static __always_inline bool check_region_inline(const void *addr,
size_t size, bool write,
unsigned long ret_ip)
{
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+ if (!kasan_enabled())
return true;
if (unlikely(size == 0))
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
{
s8 shadow_byte;
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+ if (!kasan_enabled())
return true;
shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr));
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ static void release_alloc_meta(struct kasan_alloc_meta *meta)
static void release_free_meta(const void *object, struct kasan_free_meta *meta)
{
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+ if (!kasan_enabled())
return;
/* Check if free meta is valid. */
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 129178be5e6..e0ffc16495d 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -544,12 +544,6 @@ static inline void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *address, size_t size) {
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
-#ifndef kasan_arch_is_ready
-static inline bool kasan_arch_is_ready(void) { return true; }
-#elif !defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || !defined(CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE)
-#error kasan_arch_is_ready only works in KASAN generic outline mode!
-#endif
-
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST)
void kasan_kunit_test_suite_start(void);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
index d2c70cd2afb..9db8548ccb4 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value, bool init)
{
void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+ if (!kasan_enabled())
return;
/*
@@ -150,9 +150,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_poison);
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *addr, size_t size)
{
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
- return;
-
if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) {
u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size);
*shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
@@ -390,7 +387,7 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
unsigned long shadow_start, shadow_end;
int ret;
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+ if (!kasan_enabled())
return 0;
if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr((void *)addr))
@@ -560,7 +557,7 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
unsigned long region_start, region_end;
unsigned long size;
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+ if (!kasan_enabled())
return;
region_start = ALIGN(start, KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE);
@@ -611,9 +608,6 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
* with setting memory tags, so the KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT flag is ignored.
*/
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
- return (void *)start;
-
if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
return (void *)start;
@@ -636,9 +630,6 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
*/
void __kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
{
- if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
- return;
-
if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
return;
--
2.34.1
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