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Message-ID: <20250626023617.3885806-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 10:36:17 +0800
From: GONG Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@...wei.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Roberto Sassu
<roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>, Madhavan Srinivasan
<maddy@...ux.ibm.com>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, Heiko Carstens
<hca@...ux.ibm.com>, Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>, Alexander Gordeev
<agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>
CC: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>, Christophe Leroy
<christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>, Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>, Christian
Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>, Sven Schnelle <svens@...ux.ibm.com>,
"Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>, <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>, <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>, Lu Jialin
<lujialin4@...wei.com>, <gongruiqi1@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH RESEND] integrity: Extract secure boot enquiry function out of IMA
Commit 92ad19559ea9 ("integrity: Do not load MOK and MOKx when secure
boot be disabled") utilizes arch_ima_get_secureboot() to perform a
secure boot status check before loading the Machine Owner Key (MOK).
However, only when CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT=y can this
function be functional, while this config has nothing to do with secure
boot or MOK loading.
Given that arch_ima_get_secureboot() is just a helper to retrieve info
about secure boot via EFI and doesn't necessarily be a part of IMA,
rename it to arch_integrity_get_secureboot(), decouple its functionality
from IMA and extract it to be a integrity subsystem helper, so that both
certificate loading and IMA can make use of it.
Compile-tested for powerpc, s390 and x86, all with allmodconfig.
Signed-off-by: GONG Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@...wei.com>
---
RESEND: Remove duplicated paragraph in commit message. Apology for the
mistake.
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 3 +-
arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c | 3 +-
include/linux/ima.h | 6 ---
include/linux/integrity.h | 1 +
security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +-
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 47 +-----------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/secureboot.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++
11 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/integrity/secureboot.c
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
index b7029beed847..4ceda3f534bd 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@
*/
#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <asm/secure_boot.h>
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void)
{
return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled();
}
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c
index f3c3e6e1c5d3..6fb2d551e2c2 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <asm/boot_data.h>
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void)
{
return ipl_secure_flag;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 8e29cb4e6a01..9faf3b964314 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -72,14 +72,8 @@ int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
-extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
#else
-static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
- return false;
-}
-
static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
{
return NULL;
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index f5842372359b..4bc81fe4253e 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -61,5 +61,6 @@ integrity_inode_attrs_changed(const struct integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
!inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version));
}
+extern bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void);
#endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index 92b63039c654..0770c6554a8f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o
integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) += platform_certs/machine_keyring.o
-integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
+integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += secureboot.o \
+ platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
platform_certs/load_uefi.o \
platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index b376d38b4ee6..f81be17e25a8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_EFI),y)
-ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_efi.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_efi.o ../secureboot.o
endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index f435eff4667f..41bece645348 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ core_param(ima_appraise, ima_appraise_cmdline_default, charp, 0);
void __init ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void)
{
const char *str = ima_appraise_cmdline_default;
- bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot();
+ bool sb_state = arch_integrity_get_secureboot();
int appraisal_state = ima_appraise;
if (!str)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
index 138029bfcce1..fcbc0727469e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
@@ -2,52 +2,9 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation
*/
-#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
-#include <asm/efi.h>
-
-#ifndef arch_ima_efi_boot_mode
-#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset
-#endif
-
-static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
-{
- enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
-
- if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
- }
-
- mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
- if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled)
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
- else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown)
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n");
- else
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n");
- return mode;
-}
-
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
- static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
- static bool initialized;
-
- if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
- sb_mode = arch_ima_efi_boot_mode;
-
- if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
- sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
- initialized = true;
- }
-
- if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
- return true;
- else
- return false;
-}
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
/* secureboot arch rules */
static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
@@ -67,7 +24,7 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_integrity_get_secureboot()) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
set_module_sig_enforced();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f99ab1a3b0f0..9974d89f3eca 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
switch (id) {
case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
- && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+ && arch_integrity_get_secureboot()) {
pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
return -EACCES;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index d1fdd113450a..3042a0c536d6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
}
/* the MOK/MOKx can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */
- if (!arch_ima_get_secureboot())
+ if (!arch_integrity_get_secureboot())
return 0;
mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
diff --git a/security/integrity/secureboot.c b/security/integrity/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5c50f8be6053
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2025 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
+
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+#ifndef arch_integrity_efi_boot_mode
+#define arch_integrity_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset
+#endif
+
+static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
+{
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
+
+ if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+ }
+
+ mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
+ if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled)
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode disabled\n");
+ else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown)
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode enabled\n");
+ return mode;
+}
+
+bool __weak arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
+ static bool initialized;
+
+ if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ sb_mode = arch_integrity_efi_boot_mode;
+
+ if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
+ sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
+ initialized = true;
+ }
+
+ return sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+}
--
2.25.1
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