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Message-id: <175159319224.565058.14007562517229235836@noble.neil.brown.name>
Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2025 11:39:52 +1000
From: "NeilBrown" <neil@...wn.name>
To: "Al Viro" <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Kees Cook" <kees@...nel.org>, "Joel Granados" <joel.granados@...nel.org>,
 linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, "LKML" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject:
 Re: [PATCH v3?] proc_sysctl: remove rcu_dereference() for accessing ->sysctl

On Fri, 04 Jul 2025, Al Viro wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 04, 2025 at 12:43:13AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> 
> > I would rather *not* leave a dangling pointer there, and yes, it can
> > end up being dangling.  kfree_rcu() from inside the ->evict_inode()
> > may very well happen earlier than (also RCU-delayed) freeing of struct
> > inode itself.
> > 
> > What we can do is WRITE_ONCE() to set it to NULL on the evict_inode
> > side and READ_ONCE() in the proc_sys_compare().
> > 
> > The reason why the latter is memory-safe is that ->d_compare() for
> > non-in-lookup dentries is called either under rcu_read_lock() (in which
> > case observing non-NULL means that kfree_rcu() couldn't have gotten to
> > freeing the sucker) *or* under ->d_lock, in which case the inode can't
> > reach ->evict_inode() until we are done.
> > 
> > So this predicate is very much relevant.  Have that fucker called with
> > neither rcu_read_lock() nor ->d_lock, and you might very well end up
> > with dereferencing an already freed ctl_table_header.
> 
> IOW, I would prefer to do this:

Looks good - thanks,
NeilBrown

> 
> [PATCH] fix proc_sys_compare() handling of in-lookup dentries
> 
> There's one case where ->d_compare() can be called for an in-lookup
> dentry; usually that's nothing special from ->d_compare() point of
> view, but... proc_sys_compare() is weird.
> 
> The thing is, /proc/sys subdirectories can look differently for
> different processes.  Up to and including having the same name
> resolve to different dentries - all of them hashed.
> 
> The way it's done is ->d_compare() refusing to admit a match unless
> this dentry is supposed to be visible to this caller.  The information
> needed to discriminate between them is stored in inode; it is set
> during proc_sys_lookup() and until it's done d_splice_alias() we really
> can't tell who should that dentry be visible for.
> 
> Normally there's no negative dentries in /proc/sys; we can run into
> a dying dentry in RCU dcache lookup, but those can be safely rejected.
> 
> However, ->d_compare() is also called for in-lookup dentries, before
> they get positive - or hashed, for that matter.  In case of match
> we will wait until dentry leaves in-lookup state and repeat ->d_compare()
> afterwards.  In other words, the right behaviour is to treat the
> name match as sufficient for in-lookup dentries; if dentry is not
> for us, we'll see that when we recheck once proc_sys_lookup() is
> done with it.
>     
> While we are at it, fix the misspelled READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE there.
> 
> Fixes: d9171b934526 ("parallel lookups machinery, part 4 (and last)")
> Reported-by: NeilBrown <neilb@...wn.name>
> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil@...wn.name>
> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
> ---
> diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
> index a3eb3b740f76..3604b616311c 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
> @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static void proc_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
>  
>  	head = ei->sysctl;
>  	if (head) {
> -		RCU_INIT_POINTER(ei->sysctl, NULL);
> +		WRITE_ONCE(ei->sysctl, NULL);
>  		proc_sys_evict_inode(inode, head);
>  	}
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> index cc9d74a06ff0..08b78150cdde 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> @@ -918,17 +918,21 @@ static int proc_sys_compare(const struct dentry *dentry,
>  	struct ctl_table_header *head;
>  	struct inode *inode;
>  
> -	/* Although proc doesn't have negative dentries, rcu-walk means
> -	 * that inode here can be NULL */
> -	/* AV: can it, indeed? */
> -	inode = d_inode_rcu(dentry);
> -	if (!inode)
> -		return 1;
>  	if (name->len != len)
>  		return 1;
>  	if (memcmp(name->name, str, len))
>  		return 1;
> -	head = rcu_dereference(PROC_I(inode)->sysctl);
> +
> +	// false positive is fine here - we'll recheck anyway
> +	if (d_in_lookup(dentry))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	inode = d_inode_rcu(dentry);
> +	// we just might have run into dentry in the middle of __dentry_kill()
> +	if (!inode)
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	head = READ_ONCE(PROC_I(inode)->sysctl);
>  	return !head || !sysctl_is_seen(head);
>  }
>  
> 


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