linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 3/3] integrity/platform_certs: Allow loading of keys in the static key management mode

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Message-ID: <6dfdc950-fe2c-4311-b53a-9c1439783d3a@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2025 14:13:08 +0530
From: R Nageswara Sastry <rnsastry@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@...ux.ibm.com>, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org
Cc: maddy@...ux.ibm.com, mpe@...erman.id.au, npiggin@...il.com,
        christophe.leroy@...roup.eu, naveen@...nel.org, ajd@...ux.ibm.com,
        zohar@...ux.ibm.com, nayna@...ux.ibm.com, msuchanek@...e.de,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/3] integrity/platform_certs: Allow loading of keys in
 the static key management mode


On 11/06/25 2:49 AM, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> On PLPKS enabled PowerVM LPAR, there is no provision to load signed
> third-party kernel modules when the key management mode is static. This
> is because keys from secure boot secvars are only loaded when the key
> management mode is dynamic.
>
> Allow loading of the trustedcadb and moduledb keys even in the static
> key management mode, where the secvar format string takes the form
> "ibm,plpks-sb-v0".
>
> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@...ux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@...ux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry <rnsastry@...ux.ibm.com>
With the following scenarios:
1. With and with out secure boot by enabling keystore_signed_updates and 
keystore_kbytes
2. With Dynamic Key Guest Secure Boot
3. With Static Key Guest Secure Boot
> ---
>   security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 5 +++--
>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
> index c85febca3343..714c961a00f5 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
> @@ -75,12 +75,13 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
>   		return -ENODEV;
>   
>   	// Check for known secure boot implementations from OPAL or PLPKS
> -	if (strcmp("ibm,edk2-compat-v1", buf) && strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf)) {
> +	if (strcmp("ibm,edk2-compat-v1", buf) && strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) &&
> +	    strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v0", buf)) {
>   		pr_err("Unsupported secvar implementation \"%s\", not loading certs\n", buf);
>   		return -ENODEV;
>   	}
>   
> -	if (strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) == 0)
> +	if (strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) == 0 || strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v0", buf) == 0)
>   		/* PLPKS authenticated variables ESL data is prefixed with 8 bytes of timestamp */
>   		offset = 8;
>   

-- 
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry