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Message-ID: <7724b1a0263b3a7083ba52a5639ac5a023b6e5c8.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2025 17:15:27 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: GONG Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@...wei.com>,
Roberto Sassu
<roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
Paul Moore
<paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E .
Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Lu
Jialin <lujialin4@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next RFC 0/4] IMA Root of Trust (RoT) Framework
Hi Ruiqi,
IMA has different roots of trust for secure and trusted boot. I assume this
patch set is discussing the IMA measurement root of trust.
Acronyms are "an abbreviation consisting of the first letters of each word in
the name of something, pronounced as a word"[1]. Not all acronyms are
pronounced as a word, but in this case it would be. I suggest you consider a
different acronym.
[1] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/acronym
On Mon, 2025-06-30 at 20:59 +0800, GONG Ruiqi wrote:
> Currently, the IMA subsystem can only use TPM as the Root of Trust
> (RoT) device, and its coding is tightly coupled with TPM operations.
>
> ┌──────────┐ ┌───────────┐
> ┌┴─────────┐│ ┌┴──────────┐│
> │ Programs ├┘ │ Libraries ├┘
> └────┬─────┘ └────┬──────┘ User
> ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─
> └────────┬──────┘ Kernel
> ▼
> ┌────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐
> │ IMA Hooks │ │ │
> │ (file read, executed, mmapped etc) │ │ │
> └──────────────────┬─────────────────┘ │ IMA │
> ▼ │ Initialization │
> ┌────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │
> │ IMA Measurement List │ │ │
> └──────────────────┬─────────────────┘ └────┬───────┬───┘
> extend│ calc_boot_aggregate│ init│
> ▼ ▼ ▼
> ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
> │ TPM Device Driver │
> └─────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────┘
> │
> ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─
> ▼ Hardware
> ┌──────────────────┐
> │ TPM Device │
> └──────────────────┘
>
> In recent years, new scenarios such as Confidential Computing have
> emerged, requiring IMA to use various new RoT devices proposed by
> different vendors, such as Intel TDX[1] and Huawei VirtCCA[2]. To make
> it easier for these devices to be integrated into the IMA subsystem, it
> is necessary to decouple TPM specific code from IMA, while abstracting
> IMA's configuration and operation to RoT devices into multiple
> independent interfaces, ultimately forming an IMA RoT device framework.
> This framework abstracts away the underlying details of various RoT
> devices for IMA, and each type of RoT devices can be "plugged in" and
> utilized by IMA simply via implementing the framework interfaces.
>
> ┌──────────┐ ┌───────────┐
> ┌┴─────────┐│ ┌┴──────────┐│
> │ Programs ├┘ │ Libraries ├┘
> └────┬─────┘ └────┬──────┘ User
> ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ │ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─
> └───────┬───────┘ Kernel
> ▼
> ┌────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐
> │ IMA Hooks │ │ │
> │ (file read, executed, mmapped etc) │ │ │
> └──────────────────┬─────────────────┘ │ IMA │
> ▼ │ Initialization │
> ┌────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │
> │ IMA Measurement List │ │ │
> └──────────────────┬─────────────────┘ └────┬───────┬───┘
> extend│ calc_boot_aggregate│ init│
> ▼ ▼ ▼
> ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
> │ IMA RoT │
> │ Framework │
> └───────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────┘
> ┌───────────────┬───────┴─────────┬─────────────────┐
> ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
> ┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌────────────┐
> │ VirtCCA Driver │ │ TPM Driver │ │ Intel TDX Driver │ │ xxx Driver │
> └────────┬───────┘ └─────┬──────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ └─────┬──────┘
> │ │ │ │
> ─ ─ ─ ─ ─│─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─│─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─│─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─│─ ─ ─ ─ ─
> │ │ │ │ Hardware
> ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
> ┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌────────────┐
> │ VirtCCA Device │ │ TPM Device │ │ Intel TDX Device │ │ xxx Device │
> └────────────────┘ └────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └────────────┘
>
> This patch set provides an implementation of the aforementioned IMA RoT
> framework, which can facilitate easier adaptation for new devices such
> as Intel TDX and Huawei VirtCCA, as well as the classic TPM, to be an
> RoT that IMA can utilize to maintain system's integrity.
When extending an existing subsystem, the existing security guarantees need to
persist. If they don't, there needs to be a clear explanation as to why they
don't. For example, if no measurement root of trust is specified on the boot
command line, the default measurement root of trust should be configured at
build to default to the TPM.
Do you expect to support multiple measurement roots of trust at the same time?
Mimi
>
> [1]: Reference for Intel TDX with IMA:
> https://www.intel.cn/content/www/cn/zh/developer/articles/community/runtime-integrity-measure-and-attest-trust-domain.html
>
> [2]: Reference for Huawei VirtCCA:
> https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/blob/OLK-6.6/Documentation/virtcca/virtcca.txt
>
>
> GONG Ruiqi (4):
> ima: rot: Introduce basic framework
> ima: rot: Prepare TPM as an RoT
> ima: rot: Make RoT kick in
> ima: rot: Involve per-RoT default PCR index
>
> security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 12 +-
> security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 3 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 4 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 139 +++----------------
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 4 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 14 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 39 ++----
> security/integrity/ima/ima_rot.c | 108 +++++++++++++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_rot.h | 42 ++++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 4 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_tpm.c | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_tpm.h | 19 +++
> 15 files changed, 388 insertions(+), 171 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_rot.c
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_rot.h
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_tpm.c
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_tpm.h
>
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