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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRUkKWDc39BAz6uzjRBt47wDCNkzfV=z6+Tb-RznfycsQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2025 22:45:23 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Chris PeBenito <pebenito@...e.org>
Cc: Shivank Garg <shivankg@....com>, david@...hat.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
brauner@...nel.org, rppt@...nel.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
seanjc@...gle.com, vbabka@...e.cz, willy@...radead.org, pbonzini@...hat.com,
tabba@...gle.com, afranji@...gle.com, ackerleytng@...gle.com, jack@...e.cz,
hch@...radead.org, cgzones@...glemail.com, ira.weiny@...el.com,
roypat@...zon.co.uk, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, selinux-refpolicy@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] fs: generalize anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix
secretmem LSM bypass
On Mon, Jul 7, 2025 at 4:38 PM Chris PeBenito <pebenito@...e.org> wrote:
> On 7/7/2025 4:01 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> >
> > Strictly speaking this is a regression in the kernel, even if the new
> > behavior is correct. I'm CC'ing the SELinux and Reference Policy
> > lists so that the policy devs can take a look and see what impacts
> > there might be to the various public SELinux policies. If this looks
> > like it may be a significant issue, we'll need to work around this
> > with a SELinux "policy capability" or some other compatibility
> > solution.
>
> In refpolicy, there are 34 rules for anon_inode and they all have {
> create read write map } -- none of them have the execute permission. Of
> these, only 4 are explict and could potentially be broken. The
> remaining get it due to being unconfined, thus can be immediately fixed,
> since it's unconfined.
>
> IMO, this is very low impact.
Thanks Chris, I think it's worth leaving the kernel code as-is and
just patching the selinux-testsuite. I'll send out a patch for that
tomorrow.
--
paul-moore.com
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