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Message-ID: <5ae541ce-613f-47c0-8a23-1ec9a0b346cf@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2025 09:48:21 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@...onical.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: john.johansen@...onical.com, paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com, mic@...ikod.net, kees@...nel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, takedakn@...data.co.jp,
penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp, song@...nel.org, rdunlap@...radead.org,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] lsm: introduce lsm_config_self_policy() and
lsm_config_system_policy() syscalls
On 7/9/2025 1:00 AM, Maxime Bélair wrote:
> This patchset introduces two new syscalls: lsm_config_self_policy(),
> lsm_config_system_policy() and the associated Linux Security Module hooks
> security_lsm_config_*_policy(), providing a unified interface for loading
> and managing LSM policies. These syscalls complement the existing per‑LSM
> pseudo‑filesystem mechanism and work even when those filesystems are not
> mounted or available.
>
> With these new syscalls, users and administrators may lock down access to
> the pseudo‑filesystem yet still manage LSM policies. Two tightly-scoped
> entry points then replace the many file operations exposed by those
> filesystems, significantly reducing the attack surface. This is
> particularly useful in containers or processes already confined by
> Landlock, where these pseudo‑filesystems are typically unavailable.
>
> Because they provide a logical and unified interface, these syscalls are
> simpler to use than several heterogeneous pseudo‑filesystems and avoid
> edge cases such as partially loaded policies. They also eliminates VFS
> overhead, yielding performance gains notably when many policies are
> loaded, for instance at boot time.
>
> This initial implementation is intentionally minimal to limit the scope
> of changes. Currently, only policy loading is supported, and only
> AppArmor registers this LSM hook. However, any LSM can adopt this
> interface, and future patches could extend this syscall to support more
> operations, such as replacing, removing, or querying loaded policies.
It would help me be more confident in the interface if you also included
hooks for SELinux and Smack. The API needs to be general enough to support
SELinux's atomic policy load, Smack's atomic and incremental load options,
and Smack's self rule loads. I really don't want to have to implement
lsm_config_self_policy2() when I decide to us it for Smack.
>
> Landlock already provides three Landlock‑specific syscalls (e.g.
> landlock_add_rule()) to restrict ambient rights for sets of processes
> without touching any pseudo-filesystem. lsm_config_*_policy() generalizes
> that approach to the entire LSM layer, so any module can choose to
> support either or both of these syscalls, and expose its policy
> operations through a uniform interface and reap the advantages outlined
> above.
>
> This patchset is available at [1], a minimal user space example
> showing how to use lsm_config_system_policy with AppArmor is at [2] and a
> performance benchmark of both syscalls is available at [3].
>
> [1] https://github.com/emixam16/linux/tree/lsm_syscall
> [2] https://gitlab.com/emixam16/apparmor/tree/lsm_syscall
> [3] https://gitlab.com/-/snippets/4864908
>
> ---
> Changes in v5
> - Improve syscall input verification
> - Do not export security_lsm_config_*_policy symbols
>
> Changes in v4
> - Make the syscall's maximum buffer size defined per module
> - Fix a memory leak
>
> Changes in v3
> - Fix typos
>
> Changes in v2
> - Split lsm_manage_policy() into two distinct syscalls:
> lsm_config_self_policy() and lsm_config_system_policy()
> - The LSM hook now calls only the appropriate LSM (and not all LSMs)
> - Add a configuration variable to limit the buffer size of these
> syscalls
> - AppArmor now allows stacking policies through lsm_config_self_policy()
> and loading policies in any namespace through
> lsm_config_system_policy()
> ---
>
> Maxime Bélair (3):
> Wire up lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy syscalls
> lsm: introduce security_lsm_config_*_policy hooks
> AppArmor: add support for lsm_config_self_policy and
> lsm_config_system_policy
>
> arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 2 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 2 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 2 +
> arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 2 +
> arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 +
> arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 4 +
> include/linux/security.h | 20 +++++
> include/linux/syscalls.h | 5 ++
> include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +-
> include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 8 ++
> kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 +
> security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 31 +++++++
> security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 4 +
> security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h | 3 +
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++
> security/lsm_syscalls.c | 25 ++++++
> security/security.c | 60 +++++++++++++
> tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +-
> .../arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 +
> 29 files changed, 288 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
>
> base-commit: 9c32cda43eb78f78c73aee4aa344b777714e259b
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