linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv9 02/16] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives

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Message-ID: <7d93b343-b275-4edb-ae26-4578ae53652f@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2025 09:58:23 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
 Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
 Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
 "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
 Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
 Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
 Xiongwei Song <xiongwei.song@...driver.com>, Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>,
 "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@...nel.org>,
 Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>, Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
 Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>, Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>,
 Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>,
 Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
 Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
 Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
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 <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
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 Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@...der.be>,
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 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv9 02/16] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching
 kernel alternatives

On 7/7/25 01:03, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>
> 
> For patching, the kernel initializes a temporary mm area in the lower
> half of the address range. See commit 4fc19708b165 ("x86/alternatives:
> Initialize temporary mm for patching").
> 
> Disable LASS enforcement during patching to avoid triggering a #GP
> fault.
> 
> The objtool warns due to a call to a non-allowed function that exists
> outside of the stac/clac guard, or references to any function with a
> dynamic function pointer inside the guard. See the Objtool warnings
> section #9 in the document tools/objtool/Documentation/objtool.txt.
> 
> Considering that patching is usually small, replace the memcpy() and
> memset() functions in the text poking functions with their open coded
> versions.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h   | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
> index 4f84d421d1cf..d0cc24348641 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
> @@ -23,18 +23,47 @@
>  
>  #else /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
>  
> +/*
> + * The CLAC/STAC instructions toggle the enforcement of X86_FEATURE_SMAP and
> + * X86_FEATURE_LASS.
> + *
> + * SMAP enforcement is based on the _PAGE_BIT_USER bit in the page tables: the
> + * kernel is not allowed to touch pages with the bit set unless the AC bit is
> + * set.
> + *
> + * LASS enforcement is based on bit 63 of the virtual address. The kernel is
> + * not allowed to touch memory in the lower half of the virtual address space
> + * unless the AC bit is set.
> + *
> + * Use stac()/clac() when accessing userspace (_PAGE_USER) mappings,
> + * regardless of location.
> + *
> + * Use lass_stac()/lass_clac() when accessing kernel mappings (!_PAGE_USER)
> + * in the lower half of the address space.
> + *
> + * Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative().
> + */
> +
>  static __always_inline void clac(void)
>  {
> -	/* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
>  	alternative("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
>  }
>  
>  static __always_inline void stac(void)
>  {
> -	/* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
>  	alternative("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
>  }
>  
> +static __always_inline void lass_clac(void)
> +{
> +	alternative("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_LASS);
> +}
> +
> +static __always_inline void lass_stac(void)
> +{
> +	alternative("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_LASS);
> +}

Could we please move the comments about lass_*() closer to the LASS
functions?

>  static __always_inline unsigned long smap_save(void)
>  {
>  	unsigned long flags;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> index ea1d984166cd..992ece0e879a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> @@ -2447,16 +2447,40 @@ void __init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode,
>  __ro_after_init struct mm_struct *text_poke_mm;
>  __ro_after_init unsigned long text_poke_mm_addr;
>  
> +/*
> + * Text poking creates and uses a mapping in the lower half of the
> + * address space. Relax LASS enforcement when accessing the poking
> + * address.
> + */
> +
>  static void text_poke_memcpy(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
>  {
> -	memcpy(dst, src, len);
> +	lass_stac();
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Objtool is picky about what occurs within the STAC/CLAC region
> +	 * because this code runs with protection disabled. Objtool typically
> +	 * does not permit function calls in this area.
> +	 *
> +	 * Avoid using memcpy() here. Instead, open code it.
> +	 */
> +	asm volatile("rep movsb"
> +		     : "+D" (dst), "+S" (src), "+c" (len) : : "memory");
> +
> +	lass_clac();
>  }

This didn't turn out great. At the _very_ least, we could have a:

	inline_memcpy_i_really_mean_it()

with the rep mov. Or even a #define if we were super paranoid the
compiler is out to get us.

But _actually_ open-coding inline assembly is far too ugly to live.

We can also be a bit more compact about the comments:

	/*
	 * objtool enforces a strict policy of "no function calls within
	 * AC=1 regions". Adhere to the policy by doing a memcpy() that
	 * will never result in a function call.
	 */