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Message-ID: <tencent_21B82DB792FE0049B6EF5ECD81285669C908@qq.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 16:49:22 +0800
From: jackysliu <1972843537@...com>
To: gregkh@...uxfoundation.org
Cc: 1972843537@...com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-usb@...r.kernel.org,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: [PATCH v2] usb: gadget: functioni: Fix a oob problem in rndis
From: Siyang Liu <1972843537@...com>
An out-of-bounds memory access vulnerability exists in the RNDIS
(Remote Network Driver Interface Specification) implementation.
The vulnerability stems from insufficient boundary validation when
processing SET requests with user-controlled InformationBufferOffset
and InformationBufferLength parameters.
Fix on commit id:
commit 5f60d5f6bbc1 ("move asm/unaligned.h to linux/unaligned.h")
The vulnerability can be fixed by adding addtional boundary checks
Signed-off-by: Siyang Liu <1972843537@...com>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c
index afd75d72412c..cc522fb4c06c 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c
@@ -641,7 +641,8 @@ static int rndis_set_response(struct rndis_params *params,
BufOffset = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset);
if ((BufLength > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE) ||
(BufOffset > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE) ||
- (BufOffset + 8 >= RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE))
+ (BufOffset + 8 >= RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE) ||
+ (BufOffset + BufLength+8 > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
r = rndis_add_response(params, sizeof(rndis_set_cmplt_type));
--
2.43.5
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