lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20250712232329.818226-25-ebiggers@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2025 16:23:15 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
	"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
	linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
	linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
	x86@...nel.org,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 24/26] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Use SHA-1 library instead of crypto_shash

Use the SHA-1 library functions instead of crypto_shash.  This is
simpler and faster.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig        |   4 +-
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 221 ++++------------------
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
index 1fb8aa0019953..7685457ffcb41 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -3,13 +3,11 @@ config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
 
 config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
 	bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
 	depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
 	default y
-	select CRYPTO
-	select CRYPTO_HMAC
-	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	select ASN1_ENCODER
 	select OID_REGISTRY
 	select ASN1
 	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 89c9798d18007..d1a66a0287fa5 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -5,89 +5,36 @@
  *
  * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
  */
 
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <linux/tpm.h>
 #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
 
 #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
 
-static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
-static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
 static struct tpm_chip *chip;
 static struct tpm_digest *digests;
 
-struct sdesc {
-	struct shash_desc shash;
-	char ctx[];
-};
-
-static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
-static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
-
-static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
-{
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
-	int size;
-
-	size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
-	sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sdesc)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
-	return sdesc;
-}
-
-static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
-		    unsigned char *digest)
-{
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
-	int ret;
-
-	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-	}
-
-	ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
-	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 		       unsigned int keylen, ...)
 {
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx;
 	va_list argp;
 	unsigned int dlen;
 	unsigned char *data;
-	int ret;
-
-	sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg);
-	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-	}
+	int ret = 0;
 
-	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	hmac_sha1_init_usingrawkey(&hmac_ctx, key, keylen);
 
 	va_start(argp, keylen);
 	for (;;) {
 		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
 		if (dlen == 0)
@@ -95,19 +42,15 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 		data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
 		if (data == NULL) {
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		}
-		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			break;
+		hmac_sha1_update(&hmac_ctx, data, dlen);
 	}
 	va_end(argp);
 	if (!ret)
-		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
-out:
-	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
+		hmac_sha1_final(&hmac_ctx, digest);
 	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
  * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
@@ -115,53 +58,41 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 			unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
 			unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...)
 {
 	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
 	unsigned int dlen;
 	unsigned char *data;
 	unsigned char c;
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 	va_list argp;
 
 	if (!chip)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-	}
-
 	c = !!h3;
-	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
 	va_start(argp, h3);
 	for (;;) {
 		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
 		if (dlen == 0)
 			break;
 		data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
 		if (!data) {
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		}
-		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			break;
+		sha1_update(&sha_ctx, data, dlen);
 	}
 	va_end(argp);
 	if (!ret)
-		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+		sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
 	if (!ret)
 		ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 				  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
 				  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
-out:
-	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
 
 /*
@@ -180,11 +111,11 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
 	unsigned char *enonce;
 	unsigned char *continueflag;
 	unsigned char *authdata;
 	unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
 	unsigned int dlen;
 	unsigned int dpos;
 	va_list argp;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -201,53 +132,33 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
 	continueflag = authdata - 1;
 	enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
 
-	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-	}
-	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
-				  sizeof result);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
-				  sizeof ordinal);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result));
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal));
 	va_start(argp, keylen);
 	for (;;) {
 		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
 		if (dlen == 0)
 			break;
 		dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
-		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			break;
+		sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen);
 	}
 	va_end(argp);
-	if (!ret)
-		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
 
 	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest,
 			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce,
 			  1, continueflag, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+		return ret;
 
 	if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-out:
-	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
-	return ret;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
 
 /*
  * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
@@ -271,11 +182,11 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
 	unsigned char *continueflag2;
 	unsigned char *authdata2;
 	unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
 	unsigned int dlen;
 	unsigned int dpos;
 	va_list argp;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -294,62 +205,40 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
 	continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1;
 	continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1;
 	enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
 	enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
 
-	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-	}
-	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
-				  sizeof result);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
-				  sizeof ordinal);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result));
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal));
 
 	va_start(argp, keylen2);
 	for (;;) {
 		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
 		if (dlen == 0)
 			break;
 		dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
-		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			break;
+		sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen);
 	}
 	va_end(argp);
-	if (!ret)
-		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
 
 	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
 			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
+		return ret;
+	if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
 			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+		return ret;
 	if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-out:
-	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
-	return ret;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
  * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
@@ -496,13 +385,11 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
 	dump_sess(&sess);
 
 	/* calculate encrypted authorization value */
 	memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
 
 	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -987,44 +874,10 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
 static int trusted_tpm_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
 {
 	return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len);
 }
 
-static void trusted_shash_release(void)
-{
-	if (hashalg)
-		crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
-	if (hmacalg)
-		crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
-}
-
-static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
-		pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n",
-			hmac_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
-	}
-
-	hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
-		pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n",
-			hash_alg);
-		ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
-		goto hashalg_fail;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-
-hashalg_fail:
-	crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 static int __init init_digests(void)
 {
 	int i;
 
 	digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests),
@@ -1047,19 +900,14 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	ret = init_digests();
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err_put;
-	ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto err_free;
 	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto err_release;
+		goto err_free;
 	return 0;
-err_release:
-	trusted_shash_release();
 err_free:
 	kfree(digests);
 err_put:
 	put_device(&chip->dev);
 	return ret;
@@ -1068,11 +916,10 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
 static void trusted_tpm_exit(void)
 {
 	if (chip) {
 		put_device(&chip->dev);
 		kfree(digests);
-		trusted_shash_release();
 		unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
 	}
 }
 
 struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops = {
-- 
2.50.1


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ