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Message-ID: <20250712232329.818226-25-ebiggers@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2025 16:23:15 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 24/26] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Use SHA-1 library instead of crypto_shash
Use the SHA-1 library functions instead of crypto_shash. This is
simpler and faster.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 4 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 221 ++++------------------
2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
index 1fb8aa0019953..7685457ffcb41 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -3,13 +3,11 @@ config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
default y
- select CRYPTO
- select CRYPTO_HMAC
- select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
select ASN1_ENCODER
select OID_REGISTRY
select ASN1
select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 89c9798d18007..d1a66a0287fa5 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -5,89 +5,36 @@
*
* See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
*/
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
-static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
-static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
static struct tpm_chip *chip;
static struct tpm_digest *digests;
-struct sdesc {
- struct shash_desc shash;
- char ctx[];
-};
-
-static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
-static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
-
-static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
-{
- struct sdesc *sdesc;
- int size;
-
- size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
- sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sdesc)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
- return sdesc;
-}
-
-static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
- unsigned char *digest)
-{
- struct sdesc *sdesc;
- int ret;
-
- sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
- if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
- return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
- }
-
- ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
- kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
- return ret;
-}
-
static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int keylen, ...)
{
- struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx;
va_list argp;
unsigned int dlen;
unsigned char *data;
- int ret;
-
- sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg);
- if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
- return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
- }
+ int ret = 0;
- ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
- ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
+ hmac_sha1_init_usingrawkey(&hmac_ctx, key, keylen);
va_start(argp, keylen);
for (;;) {
dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
if (dlen == 0)
@@ -95,19 +42,15 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
if (data == NULL) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
- ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
- if (ret < 0)
- break;
+ hmac_sha1_update(&hmac_ctx, data, dlen);
}
va_end(argp);
if (!ret)
- ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
-out:
- kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
+ hmac_sha1_final(&hmac_ctx, digest);
return ret;
}
/*
* calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
@@ -115,53 +58,41 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...)
{
unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
- struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
unsigned int dlen;
unsigned char *data;
unsigned char c;
- int ret;
+ int ret = 0;
va_list argp;
if (!chip)
return -ENODEV;
- sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
- if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
- return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
- }
-
c = !!h3;
- ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
+ sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
va_start(argp, h3);
for (;;) {
dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
if (dlen == 0)
break;
data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
if (!data) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
- ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
- if (ret < 0)
- break;
+ sha1_update(&sha_ctx, data, dlen);
}
va_end(argp);
if (!ret)
- ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+ sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
if (!ret)
ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
-out:
- kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
/*
@@ -180,11 +111,11 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
unsigned char *enonce;
unsigned char *continueflag;
unsigned char *authdata;
unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
- struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
unsigned int dlen;
unsigned int dpos;
va_list argp;
int ret;
@@ -201,53 +132,33 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
return -EINVAL;
authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
continueflag = authdata - 1;
enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
- sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
- if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
- return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
- }
- ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
- ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
- sizeof result);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
- ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
- sizeof ordinal);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
+ sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
+ sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result));
+ sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal));
va_start(argp, keylen);
for (;;) {
dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
if (dlen == 0)
break;
dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
- ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
- if (ret < 0)
- break;
+ sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen);
}
va_end(argp);
- if (!ret)
- ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
+ sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce,
1, continueflag, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
+ return ret;
if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
- ret = -EINVAL;
-out:
- kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
- return ret;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
/*
* verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
@@ -271,11 +182,11 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
unsigned char *continueflag2;
unsigned char *authdata2;
unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
- struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
unsigned int dlen;
unsigned int dpos;
va_list argp;
int ret;
@@ -294,62 +205,40 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1;
continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1;
enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
- sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
- if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
- return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
- }
- ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
- ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
- sizeof result);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
- ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
- sizeof ordinal);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
+ sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
+ sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result));
+ sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal));
va_start(argp, keylen2);
for (;;) {
dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
if (dlen == 0)
break;
dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
- ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
- if (ret < 0)
- break;
+ sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen);
}
va_end(argp);
- if (!ret)
- ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
+ sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
- if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ return ret;
+ if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
+ return ret;
if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
- ret = -EINVAL;
-out:
- kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
- return ret;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
* own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
@@ -496,13 +385,11 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
dump_sess(&sess);
/* calculate encrypted authorization value */
memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
- ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
+ sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
@@ -987,44 +874,10 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
static int trusted_tpm_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
{
return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len);
}
-static void trusted_shash_release(void)
-{
- if (hashalg)
- crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
- if (hmacalg)
- crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
-}
-
-static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
-{
- int ret;
-
- hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
- pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n",
- hmac_alg);
- return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
- }
-
- hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
- pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n",
- hash_alg);
- ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
- goto hashalg_fail;
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-hashalg_fail:
- crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
- return ret;
-}
-
static int __init init_digests(void)
{
int i;
digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests),
@@ -1047,19 +900,14 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
return -ENODEV;
ret = init_digests();
if (ret < 0)
goto err_put;
- ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
- if (ret < 0)
- goto err_free;
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
if (ret < 0)
- goto err_release;
+ goto err_free;
return 0;
-err_release:
- trusted_shash_release();
err_free:
kfree(digests);
err_put:
put_device(&chip->dev);
return ret;
@@ -1068,11 +916,10 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
static void trusted_tpm_exit(void)
{
if (chip) {
put_device(&chip->dev);
kfree(digests);
- trusted_shash_release();
unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
}
}
struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops = {
--
2.50.1
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