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Message-ID: <854ivcw81l.fsf@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2025 13:59:34 +0000
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<bp@...en8.de>, <x86@...nel.org>
CC: <seanjc@...gle.com>, <tglx@...utronix.de>, <mingo@...hat.com>,
<dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <santosh.shukla@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted
TSC MSRs
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> writes:
> On 7/16/25 00:53, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
>>
>> Currently, when a Secure TSC enabled SNP guest attempts to write to the
>> intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR (a read-only MSR), the guest kernel response
>> incorrectly implies a VMM configuration error, when in fact it is the usual
>> VMM configuration to intercept writes to read-only MSRs, unless explicitly
>> documented.
>>
>> Modify the intercepted TSC MSR #VC handling:
>> * Write to GUEST_TSC_FREQ will generate a #GP instead of terminating the
>> guest
>> * Write to MSR_IA32_TSC will generate a #GP instead of silently ignoring it
>>
>> Add a WARN_ONCE to log the incident, as well-behaved SNP guest kernels
>> should never attempt to write to these MSRs.
>>
>> However, continue to terminate the guest when reading from intercepted
>> GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR with Secure TSC enabled, as intercepted reads indicate
>> an improper VMM configuration for Secure TSC enabled SNP guests.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
>> Co-developed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++---------------
>> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
>> index faf1fce89ed4..18be9f8bd015 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
>> @@ -371,29 +371,30 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_caa(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
>> * executing with Secure TSC enabled, so special handling is required for
>> * accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC and MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ.
>> */
>> -static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
>> +static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write,
>> + struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>
> The pt_regs pointer is part of the es_em_ctxt struct, so probably just
> change this to:
>
> static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, bool write)
>
> and then get the regs pointer from ctxt:
>
> struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
Ack
>
>> {
>> u64 tsc;
>>
>> /*
>> - * GUEST_TSC_FREQ should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is enabled.
>> - * Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
>> + * Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC to
>> + * return undefined values, and GUEST_TSC_FREQ is read-only. Generate
>> + * a #GP on all writes, but WARN to log a kernel bug.
>> */
>> - if (regs->cx == MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ)
>> - return ES_VMM_ERROR;
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(write)) {
>
> Do we want to capture individual WARNs for each MSR? I guess I'm ok with
> a single WARN for either MSR, but just asking the question.
Right, I had thought about this and concluded that a single WARN should
be fine. The chance of both the MSR being intercepted and written are
pretty low, and anyways a GP# will be generate for all the writes.
Regards,
Nikunj
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