linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] tracing/osnoise: Fix crash in timerlat_dump

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Message-Id: <20250717083028.823c06845d60927b6773322f@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2025 08:30:28 +0900
From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@...nel.org>
To: Tomas Glozar <tglozar@...hat.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Linux Trace Kernel
 <linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
 John Kacur <jkacur@...hat.com>, Luis Goncalves <lgoncalv@...hat.com>,
 Attila Fazekas <afazekas@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tracing/osnoise: Fix crash in timerlat_dump_stack()

On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 16:36:01 +0200
Tomas Glozar <tglozar@...hat.com> wrote:

> We have observed kernel panics when using timerlat with stack saving,
> with the following dmesg output:
> 
> memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 88 byte write of buffer size 0
> WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 8153 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x55/0xa0
> CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 8153 Comm: timerlatu/2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.15.3-200.fc42.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
> Call Trace:
>  <TASK>
>  ? trace_buffer_lock_reserve+0x2a/0x60
>  __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
>  __timerlat_dump_stack.cold+0xd/0xd
>  timerlat_dump_stack.part.0+0x47/0x80
>  timerlat_fd_read+0x36d/0x390
>  vfs_read+0xe2/0x390
>  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d5/0x210
>  ksys_read+0x73/0xe0
>  do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160
>  ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
> 
> __timerlat_dump_stack() constructs the ftrace stack entry like this:
> 
> struct stack_entry *entry;
> ...
> memcpy(&entry->caller, fstack->calls, size);
> entry->size = fstack->nr_entries;
> 
> Since commit e7186af7fb26 ("tracing: Add back FORTIFY_SOURCE logic to
> kernel_stack event structure"), struct stack_entry marks its caller
> field with __counted_by(size). At the time of the memcpy, entry->size
> contains garbage from the ringbuffer, which under some circumstances is
> zero, triggering a kernel panic by buffer overflow.
> 
> Populate the size field before the memcpy so that the out-of-bounds
> check knows the correct size. This is analogous to
> __ftrace_trace_stack().
> 

Looks good to me.

Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@...nel.org>

Thank you!

> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Fixes: e7186af7fb26 ("tracing: Add back FORTIFY_SOURCE logic to kernel_stack event structure")
> Signed-off-by: Tomas Glozar <tglozar@...hat.com>
> ---
>  kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> Note: This has been so far only reproduced on laptops (three different
> machines). Not sure what the reason for that is, but it is clearly
> a bug.
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c b/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c
> index 6819b93309ce..fd259da0aa64 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c
> @@ -637,8 +637,8 @@ __timerlat_dump_stack(struct trace_buffer *buffer, struct trace_stack *fstack, u
>  
>  	entry = ring_buffer_event_data(event);
>  
> -	memcpy(&entry->caller, fstack->calls, size);
>  	entry->size = fstack->nr_entries;
> +	memcpy(&entry->caller, fstack->calls, size);
>  
>  	trace_buffer_unlock_commit_nostack(buffer, event);
>  }
> -- 
> 2.47.1
> 
> 


-- 
Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@...nel.org>