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Message-ID: <20250716055315.2229037-1-nikunj@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:23:15 +0530
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
To: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <bp@...en8.de>, <x86@...nel.org>
CC: <seanjc@...gle.com>, <tglx@...utronix.de>, <mingo@...hat.com>,
<dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
<santosh.shukla@....com>, Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Currently, when a Secure TSC enabled SNP guest attempts to write to the
intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR (a read-only MSR), the guest kernel response
incorrectly implies a VMM configuration error, when in fact it is the usual
VMM configuration to intercept writes to read-only MSRs, unless explicitly
documented.
Modify the intercepted TSC MSR #VC handling:
* Write to GUEST_TSC_FREQ will generate a #GP instead of terminating the
guest
* Write to MSR_IA32_TSC will generate a #GP instead of silently ignoring it
Add a WARN_ONCE to log the incident, as well-behaved SNP guest kernels
should never attempt to write to these MSRs.
However, continue to terminate the guest when reading from intercepted
GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR with Secure TSC enabled, as intercepted reads indicate
an improper VMM configuration for Secure TSC enabled SNP guests.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Co-developed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
---
arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
index faf1fce89ed4..18be9f8bd015 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
@@ -371,29 +371,30 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_caa(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
* executing with Secure TSC enabled, so special handling is required for
* accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC and MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ.
*/
-static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
+static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u64 tsc;
/*
- * GUEST_TSC_FREQ should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is enabled.
- * Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
+ * Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC to
+ * return undefined values, and GUEST_TSC_FREQ is read-only. Generate
+ * a #GP on all writes, but WARN to log a kernel bug.
*/
- if (regs->cx == MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ)
- return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(write)) {
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_GP;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = 0;
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ }
/*
- * Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC
- * to return undefined values, so ignore all writes.
- *
- * Reads: Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value, use
- * the value returned by rdtsc_ordered().
+ * GUEST_TSC_FREQ read should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is
+ * enabled. Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
*/
- if (write) {
- WARN_ONCE(1, "TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n");
- return ES_OK;
- }
+ if (regs->cx == MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ)
+ return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+ /* Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value. */
tsc = rdtsc_ordered();
regs->ax = lower_32_bits(tsc);
regs->dx = upper_32_bits(tsc);
@@ -416,7 +417,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
case MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ:
if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
- return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(regs, write);
+ return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(regs, write, ctxt);
break;
default:
break;
base-commit: 9f4a425223f3bd8ccaebc7f4f42b1d8c5f12fb45
--
2.43.0
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