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Message-ID: <11c531fb-7c51-423f-bf75-ffa13b2039f1@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2025 10:59:39 +0200
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....cyber.gouv.fr>
To: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Olivier Bal-Petre <olivier.bal-petre@....cyber.gouv.fr>,
Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: hidepid: Fixes hidepid non dumpable behavior
Note that a yama patch has also been sent [1].
[1]:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250718-yama_fix-v1-1-a51455359e67@ssi.gouv.fr/
Best regards,
Nicolas
On 7/18/25 10:47, nicolas.bouchinet@....cyber.gouv.fr wrote:
> From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>
>
> The hidepid mount option documentation defines the following modes:
>
> - "noaccess": user may not access any `/proc/<pid>/ directories but
> their own.
> - "invisible": all `/proc/<pid>/` will be fully invisible to other users.
> - "ptraceable": means that procfs should only contain `/proc/<pid>/`
> directories that the caller can ptrace.
>
> We thus expect that with "noaccess" and "invisible" users would be able to
> see their own processes in `/proc/<pid>/`.
>
> The implementation of hidepid however control accesses using the
> `ptrace_may_access()` function in any cases. Thus, if a process set
> itself as non-dumpable using the `prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE,
> SUID_DUMP_DISABLE)` it becomes invisible to the user.
>
> This patch fixes the `has_pid_permissions()` function in order to make
> its behavior to match the documentation.
>
> Note that since `ptrace_may_access()` is not called anymore with
> "noaccess" and "invisible", the `security_ptrace_access_check()` will no
> longer be called either.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index c667702dc69b8ca2531e88e12ed7a18533f294dd..fb128cb5f95fe65016fce96c75aee18c762a30f2 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -746,9 +746,12 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
> struct task_struct *task,
> enum proc_hidepid hide_pid_min)
> {
> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
> + kuid_t caller_uid;
> + kgid_t caller_gid;
> /*
> - * If 'hidpid' mount option is set force a ptrace check,
> - * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall
> + * If 'hidepid=ptraceable' mount option is set, force a ptrace check.
> + * We indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall
> * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS
> */
> if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE)
> @@ -758,7 +761,25 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
> return true;
> if (in_group_p(fs_info->pid_gid))
> return true;
> - return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
> +
> + task_lock(task);
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + caller_uid = cred->fsuid;
> + caller_gid = cred->fsgid;
> + tcred = __task_cred(task);
> + if (uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->euid) &&
> + uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->suid) &&
> + uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->uid) &&
> + gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->egid) &&
> + gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
> + gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid)) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + task_unlock(task);
> + return true;
> + }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + task_unlock(task);
> + return false;
> }
>
>
>
> ---
> base-commit: 884a80cc9208ce75831b2376f2b0464018d7f2c4
> change-id: 20250718-hidepid_fix-d0743d0540e7
>
> Best regards,
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