linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 00/12] kasan: unify kasan_arch_is_ready() and remove arch-specific implementations

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Message-ID: <f7051d82-559f-420d-a766-6126ba2ed5ab@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2025 19:32:51 +0200
From: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
To: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@...il.com>
Cc: hca@...ux.ibm.com, christophe.leroy@...roup.eu, andreyknvl@...il.com,
 agordeev@...ux.ibm.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, glider@...gle.com,
 dvyukov@...gle.com, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, loongarch@...ts.linux.dev,
 linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
 linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-um@...ts.infradead.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/12] kasan: unify kasan_arch_is_ready() and remove
 arch-specific implementations



On 7/22/25 8:21 PM, Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 22, 2025 at 3:59 AM Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 7/17/25 4:27 PM, Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov wrote:
>>
>>> === Testing with patches
>>>
>>> Testing in v3:
>>>
>>> - Compiled every affected arch with no errors:
>>>
>>> $ make CC=clang LD=ld.lld AR=llvm-ar NM=llvm-nm STRIP=llvm-strip \
>>>       OBJCOPY=llvm-objcopy OBJDUMP=llvm-objdump READELF=llvm-readelf \
>>>       HOSTCC=clang HOSTCXX=clang++ HOSTAR=llvm-ar HOSTLD=ld.lld \
>>>       ARCH=$ARCH
>>>
>>> $ clang --version
>>> ClangBuiltLinux clang version 19.1.4
>>> Target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
>>> Thread model: posix
>>>
>>> - make ARCH=um produces the warning during compiling:
>>>       MODPOST Module.symvers
>>>       WARNING: modpost: vmlinux: section mismatch in reference: \
>>>               kasan_init+0x43 (section: .ltext) -> \
>>>               kasan_init_generic (section: .init.text)
>>>
>>> AFAIU, it's due to the code in arch/um/kernel/mem.c, where kasan_init()
>>> is placed in own section ".kasan_init", which calls kasan_init_generic()
>>> which is marked with "__init".
>>>
>>> - Booting via qemu-system- and running KUnit tests:
>>>
>>> * arm64  (GENERIC, HW_TAGS, SW_TAGS): no regression, same above results.
>>> * x86_64 (GENERIC): no regression, no errors
>>>
>>
>> It would be interesting to see whether ARCH_DEFER_KASAN=y arches work.
>> These series add static key into __asan_load*()/_store*() which are called
>> from everywhere, including the code patching static branches during the switch.
>>
>> I have suspicion that the code patching static branches during static key switch
>> might not be prepared to the fact the current CPU might try to execute this static
>> branch in the middle of switch.
> 
> AFAIU, you're referring to this function in mm/kasan/generic.c:
> 
> static __always_inline bool check_region_inline(const void *addr,
> 
>       size_t size, bool write,
> 
>       unsigned long ret_ip)
> {
>         if (!kasan_shadow_initialized())
>                 return true;
> ...
> }
> 
> and particularly, to architectures that selects ARCH_DEFER_KASAN=y, which are
> loongarch, powerpc, um. So when these arch try to enable the static key:
> 
> 1. static_branch_enable(&kasan_flag_enabled) called
> 2. Kernel patches code - changes jump instructions
> 3. Code patching involves memory writes
> 4. Memory writes can trigger any KASAN wrapper function
> 5. Wrapper calls kasan_shadow_initialized()
> 6. kasan_shadow_initialized() calls static_branch_likely(&kasan_flag_enabled)
> 7. This reads the static key being patched --- this is the potential issue?
> 


Yes, that's right.


> The current runtime check is following in tis v3 patch series:
> 
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_DEFER_KASAN
> ...
> static __always_inline bool kasan_shadow_initialized(void)
> {
>         return static_branch_likely(&kasan_flag_enabled);
> }
> ...
> #endif
> 
> I wonder, if I should add some protection only for KASAN_GENERIC,
> where check_region_inline() is called (or for all KASAN modes?):
> 
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_DEFER_KASAN
> ...
> static __always_inline bool kasan_shadow_initialized(void)
> {
>         /* Avoid recursion (?) during static key patching */
>         if (static_key_count(&kasan_flag_enabled.key) < 0)
>                 return false;
>         return static_branch_likely(&kasan_flag_enabled);
> }
> ...
> #endif
> 
> Please suggest where the issue is and if I understood the problem.

I don't know if it's a real problem or not. I'm just pointing out that we might
have tricky use case here and maybe that's a problem, because nobody had such use
case in mind. But maybe it's just fine.
I think we just need to boot test it, to see if this works.

> I might try to run QEMU on powerpc with KUnits to see if I see any logs.
powerpc used static key same way before your patches, so powerpc should be fine.