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Message-ID: <aIPI9xv-HxTPWMUp@google.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2025 18:12:07 +0000
From: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@...gle.com>
To: Nicolin Chen <nicolinc@...dia.com>
Cc: Pranjal Shrivastava <praan@...gle.com>, jgg@...dia.com, will@...nel.org,
	joro@...tes.org, robin.murphy@....com,
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, iommu@...ts.linux.dev,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-tegra@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Replace vsmmu_size/type with
 get_viommu_size

On Fri, Jul 25, 2025 at 09:24:23AM -0700, Nicolin Chen wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 25, 2025 at 09:18:35AM +0000, Mostafa Saleh wrote:
> > > > > > On Wed, Jul 23, 2025 at 01:37:53PM +0000, Pranjal Shrivastava wrote:
> > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 21, 2025 at 01:04:44PM -0700, Nicolin Chen wrote:
> > > > Had the
> > > > vintf_size rejected it, we wouldn't be calling the init op.
> > > 
> > > A data corruption could happen any time, not related to the
> > > init op. A concurrent buggy thread can overwrite the vIOMMU
> > > object when a write access to its adjacent memory overflows.
> > 
> > Can you please elaborate on that, as memory corruption can happen
> > any time event after the next check and there is no way to defend
> > against that?
> 
> That narrative is under a condition (in the context) "when there
> is a kernel bug corrupting data" :)
> 
> E.g. some new lines of code allocates a wrong size of memory and
> writes above the size. If that memory is near this vIOMMU object
> it might overwrite to this vIOMMU object that this function gets.
> 
> This certainly won't happen if everything is sane.

I see, but I don't think we should do anything about that, there are
100s of structs in the kernel, we can't add checks everywhere, and I
don't see anything special about this path to add an assertion, this
kind of defensive programming isn't really helpful. We just need to
review any new code properly :)

Thanks,
Mostafa

> 
> Nicolin

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