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Message-ID: <20250728135216.48084-18-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2025 19:21:54 +0530
From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" <aneesh.kumar@...nel.org>
To: linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev
Cc: linux-pci@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
aik@....com,
lukas@...ner.de,
Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@...ux.intel.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@....com>,
Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>,
Wilfred Mallawa <wilfred.mallawa@....com>,
Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@...ux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@...wei.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 17/38] X.509: Parse Subject Alternative Name in certificates
From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@...ner.de>
The upcoming support for PCI device authentication with CMA-SPDM
(PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31) requires validating the Subject Alternative Name
in X.509 certificates.
Store a pointer to the Subject Alternative Name upon parsing for
consumption by CMA-SPDM.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@...ner.de>
Reviewed-by: Wilfred Mallawa <wilfred.mallawa@....com>
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@...ux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@...wei.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 9 +++++++++
include/keys/x509-parser.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 2ffe4ae90bea..ac8a01c2b9fc 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -571,6 +571,15 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return 0;
}
+ if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectAltName) {
+ if (ctx->cert->raw_san)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ ctx->cert->raw_san = v;
+ ctx->cert->raw_san_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_keyUsage) {
/*
* Get hold of the keyUsage bit string
diff --git a/include/keys/x509-parser.h b/include/keys/x509-parser.h
index 37436a5c7526..8e450befe3b9 100644
--- a/include/keys/x509-parser.h
+++ b/include/keys/x509-parser.h
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ struct x509_certificate {
unsigned raw_subject_size;
unsigned raw_skid_size;
const void *raw_skid; /* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */
+ const void *raw_san; /* Raw subjectAltName in ASN.1 */
+ unsigned raw_san_size;
unsigned index;
bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */
bool verified;
--
2.43.0
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