linux-kernel - Re: [RESEND PATCH 1/2] dma/pool: Use vmap() address for memory encryption helpers on ARM64

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <8fd39851-4bbc-4a31-84d9-5939b519d308@arm.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2025 13:09:52 +0100
From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
 Shanker Donthineni <sdonthineni@...dia.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
 Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@...sung.com>,
 Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
 Steven Price <steven.price@....com>, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
 Gavin Shan <gshan@...hat.com>, Vikram Sethi <vsethi@...dia.com>,
 Jason Sequeira <jsequeira@...dia.com>, Dev Jain <dev.jain@....com>,
 David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 iommu@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH 1/2] dma/pool: Use vmap() address for memory
 encryption helpers on ARM64

On 2025-08-11 9:48 am, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 10, 2025 at 07:50:34PM -0500, Shanker Donthineni wrote:
>> In atomic_pool_expand(), set_memory_encrypted()/set_memory_decrypted()
>> are currently called with page_to_virt(page). On ARM64 with
>> CONFIG_DMA_DIRECT_REMAP=y, the atomic pool is mapped via vmap(), so
>> page_to_virt(page) does not reference the actual mapped region.
>>
>> Using this incorrect address can cause encryption attribute updates to
>> be applied to the wrong memory region. On ARM64 systems with memory
>> encryption enabled (e.g. CCA), this can lead to data corruption or
>> crashes.
>>
>> Fix this by using the vmap() address ('addr') on ARM64 when invoking
>> the memory encryption helpers, while retaining the existing
>> page_to_virt(page) usage for other architectures.
>>
>> Fixes: 76a19940bd62 ("dma-direct: atomic allocations must come from atomic coherent pools")
>> Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <sdonthineni@...dia.com>
>> ---
>>   kernel/dma/pool.c | 8 ++++----
>>   1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/dma/pool.c b/kernel/dma/pool.c
>> index 7b04f7575796b..ba08a301590fd 100644
>> --- a/kernel/dma/pool.c
>> +++ b/kernel/dma/pool.c
>> @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ static int atomic_pool_expand(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t pool_size,
>>   {
>>   	unsigned int order;
>>   	struct page *page = NULL;
>> +	void *vaddr;
>>   	void *addr;
>>   	int ret = -ENOMEM;
>>   
>> @@ -113,8 +114,8 @@ static int atomic_pool_expand(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t pool_size,
>>   	 * Memory in the atomic DMA pools must be unencrypted, the pools do not
>>   	 * shrink so no re-encryption occurs in dma_direct_free().
>>   	 */
>> -	ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)page_to_virt(page),
>> -				   1 << order);
>> +	vaddr = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64) ? addr : page_to_virt(page);
> 
> There's address calculation just before this code:
> 
> #ifdef CONFIG_DMA_DIRECT_REMAP
> 	addr = dma_common_contiguous_remap(page, pool_size,
> 					   pgprot_dmacoherent(PAGE_KERNEL),
> 					   __builtin_return_address(0));
> 	if (!addr)
> 		goto free_page;
> #else
> 	addr = page_to_virt(page);
> #endif
> 
> It should be enough to s/page_to_virt(page)/addr in the call to
> set_memory_decrypted().

Indeed, and either way this is clearly a DMA_DIRECT_REMAP concern rather 
than just an ARM64 one.

Thanks,
Robin.

>> +	ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, 1 << order);
>>   	if (ret)
>>   		goto remove_mapping;
>>   	ret = gen_pool_add_virt(pool, (unsigned long)addr, page_to_phys(page),
>> @@ -126,8 +127,7 @@ static int atomic_pool_expand(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t pool_size,
>>   	return 0;
>>   
>>   encrypt_mapping:
>> -	ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)page_to_virt(page),
>> -				   1 << order);
>> +	ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, 1 << order);
>>   	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret)) {
>>   		/* Decrypt succeeded but encrypt failed, purposely leak */
>>   		goto out;
>> -- 
>> 2.25.1
>>
>