linux-kernel - [PATCH v4 15/18] kasan: x86: Logical bit shift for kasan_mem_to

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Message-ID: <a1a7d761bad9ead5596edb2dbe62cab26c24602a.1755004923.git.maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2025 15:23:51 +0200
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@...el.com>
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Subject: [PATCH v4 15/18] kasan: x86: Logical bit shift for kasan_mem_to_shadow

While generally tag-based KASAN adopts an arithemitc bit shift to
convert a memory address to a shadow memory address, it doesn't work for
all cases on x86. Testing different shadow memory offsets proved that
either 4 or 5 level paging didn't work correctly or inline mode ran into
issues. Thus the best working scheme is the logical bit shift and
non-canonical shadow offset that x86 uses for generic KASAN, of course
adjusted for the increased granularity from 8 to 16 bytes.

Add an arch specific implementation of kasan_mem_to_shadow() that uses
the logical bit shift.

The non-canonical hook tries to calculate whether an address came from
kasan_mem_to_shadow(). First it checks whether this address fits into
the legal set of values possible to output from the mem to shadow
function.

Tie both generic and tag-based x86 KASAN modes to the address range
check associated with generic KASAN.

Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@...el.com>
---
Changelog v4:
- Add this patch to the series.

 arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h | 8 ++++++++
 mm/kasan/report.c            | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h
index 5bf38bb836e1..f3e34a9754d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
 
+static inline void *__kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr)
+{
+	return (void *)((unsigned long)addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
+		+ KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
+}
+
+#define kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr)	__kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr)
+
 #define __tag_shifted(tag)		FIELD_PREP(GENMASK_ULL(60, 57), tag)
 #define __tag_reset(addr)		(sign_extend64((u64)(addr), 56))
 #define __tag_get(addr)			((u8)FIELD_GET(GENMASK_ULL(60, 57), (u64)addr))
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index cfa2da0e2985..11c8b3ddb4cc 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -648,13 +648,14 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
 	const char *bug_type;
 
 	/*
-	 * For Generic KASAN, kasan_mem_to_shadow() uses the logical right shift
+	 * For Generic KASAN and Software Tag-Based mode on the x86
+	 * architecture, kasan_mem_to_shadow() uses the logical right shift
 	 * and never overflows with the chosen KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET values (on
 	 * both x86 and arm64). Thus, the possible shadow addresses (even for
 	 * bogus pointers) belong to a single contiguous region that is the
 	 * result of kasan_mem_to_shadow() applied to the whole address space.
 	 */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) {
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
 		if (addr < (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)(0UL)) ||
 		    addr > (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)(~0UL)))
 			return;
-- 
2.50.1