[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <1f73657c-74b3-44a7-bee4-b7cda1a75a02@pascal-lab.net>
Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2025 15:31:54 +0800
From: Yujun Dong <yujundong@...cal-lab.net>
To: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@....com>,
linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>, Ian Rogers <irogers@...gle.com>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
"Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf branch: Fix heap out-of-bounds write in
branch_type_count()
On 2025/8/11 15:03, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
> On 09/08/25 3:08 PM, Yujun Dong wrote:
> > The branch_type_count() function writes to
st->new_counts[flags->new_type]
> > when flags->type is PERF_BR_EXTEND_ABI. However, while the array
> > st->new_counts is sized for PERF_BR_NEW_MAX (8) entries, the field
> > flags->new_type is a 4-bit unsigned value and may hold values up to 15.
> >
> > This mismatch allows crafted perf data to trigger a heap out-of-bounds
> > write when flags->new_type >= 8, leading to memory corruption.
>
> Crafted ? How could flags->new_type >= 8 when PERF_BR_NEW_MAX is
capped at 8.
> Is this a real scenario that happened on a system ?
>
Thanks for your review and for raising that question. The new_type field
in struct branch_flags is declared as a 4-bit bitfield (u64 new_type:4),
meaning it can hold values from 0 to 15, even though PERF_BR_NEW_MAX is
defined as 8. So, it's entirely possible for flags->new_type to be >= 8.
In fact, I've observed such cases when running real-world perf record/top,
where perf.data produced contains invalid new_type values, likely due to
other bugs or unexpected data corruption. Additionally, a maliciously
crafted perf.data file can also force this out-of-bounds write.
> >
> > Add a bounds check to ensure flags->new_type is less than
> > PERF_BR_NEW_MAX before accessing the new_counts array.
>
> But it might make sense to add this check just to be on the safer side.
>
Notably, new_type is only used in two places:
1. In branch_new_type_name(), where the bounds are already validated.
2. In branch_type_count(), where the current patch now adds the
necessary check.
Admittedly, the mismatch between the bit-field width (0-15) and
PERF_BR_NEW_MAX (8) is the root cause. While adjusting the bit-field
to match PERF_BR_NEW_MAX would also resolve the mismatch, that risks
breaking existing compatibility. Therefore, adding a bounds check at
the use site is the least disruptive correction.
> >
> > Fixes: 0ddea8e2a0c2 ("perf branch: Extend branch type classification")
> > Signed-off-by: Yujun Dong <yujundong@...cal-lab.net>
> > ---
> > tools/perf/util/branch.c | 8 +++++---
> > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/branch.c b/tools/perf/util/branch.c
> > index 3712be067464..8ea6628c7735 100644
> > --- a/tools/perf/util/branch.c
> > +++ b/tools/perf/util/branch.c
> > @@ -21,10 +21,12 @@ void branch_type_count(struct branch_type_stat
*st, struct branch_flags *flags,
> > if (flags->type == PERF_BR_UNKNOWN || from == 0)
> > return;
> >
> > - if (flags->type == PERF_BR_EXTEND_ABI)
> > - st->new_counts[flags->new_type]++;
> > - else
> > + if (flags->type == PERF_BR_EXTEND_ABI) {
> > + if (flags->new_type < PERF_BR_NEW_MAX)
> > + st->new_counts[flags->new_type]++;
> > + } else {
> > st->counts[flags->type]++;
> > + }
> >
> > if (flags->type == PERF_BR_COND) {
> > if (to > from)
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists