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Message-ID: <8caaa7fabf2446ffbac922dafaed3dc9@baidu.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2025 05:28:18 +0000
From: "Li,Rongqing" <lirongqing@...du.com>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
CC: "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>, "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
"peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>, "jpoimboe@...nel.org"
<jpoimboe@...nel.org>, "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
"dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, "x86@...nel.org"
<x86@...nel.org>, "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>, "david.kaplan@....com"
<david.kaplan@....com>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [????] Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Fix GDS mitigation check for CPUs
without ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
> Sent: 2025年8月15日 13:09
> To: Li,Rongqing <lirongqing@...du.com>
> Cc: tglx@...utronix.de; bp@...en8.de; peterz@...radead.org;
> jpoimboe@...nel.org; mingo@...hat.com; dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com;
> x86@...nel.org; hpa@...or.com; david.kaplan@....com;
> linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: [????] Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Fix GDS mitigation check for CPUs without
> ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL
>
> On Fri, Aug 15, 2025 at 11:53:34AM +0800, lirongqing wrote:
> > From: Li RongQing <lirongqing@...du.com>
> >
> > The commit 8c7261abcb7ad("x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for
> > GDS") caused call traces during secondary CPU initialization because
> > it didn't properly handle CPUs that lack the ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL capability.
> >
> > For CPUs without ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL support, we should set the
> > mitigation to GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED rather than
> > GDS_MITIGATION_OFF, as these CPUs may still be vulnerable but cannot
> disable mitigation.
> >
> > Add the missing check for ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL to properly determine the
> > mitigation state for affected CPUs.
> >
> > [ 2.809147] unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x123 at rIP:
> 0xffffffffb3452807 (update_gds_msr+0x87/0xe0)
> > (update_gds_msr+0x87/0xe0)
> > [ 2.809147] Call Trace:
> > [ 2.809147] <TASK>
> > [ 2.809147] identify_secondary_cpu+0x72/0x90
> > [ 2.809147] start_secondary+0x7a/0x140
> > [ 2.809147] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
> > [ 2.809147] </TASK>
> > [ 2.809147] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x123 (tried to write
> 0x0000000000000010) at rIP: 0xffffffffb34527b8
> > (update_gds_msr+0x38/0xe0)
> > [ 2.809147] Call Trace:
> > [ 2.809147] <TASK>
> > [ 2.809147] identify_secondary_cpu+0x72/0x90
> > [ 2.809147] start_secondary+0x7a/0x140
> > [ 2.809147] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
> > [ 2.809147] </TASK>
> > [ 2.809147] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > [ 2.809147] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:1053
> update_gds_msr+0x9b/0xe0
> >
> > Fixes: 8c7261abcb7ad ("x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS")
> > Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@...du.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 ++
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > index b74bf93..3af911c 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > @@ -1071,6 +1071,8 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
> > gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
> > else {
> > gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
> > + if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL))
>
> This check is already present few lines below.
>
> > + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
> > return;
>
> To avoid duplicating, a better fix could be to not return here, and let the next
> block DTRT:
But if cpu has ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL, the next block will be skipped, and the codes after checking ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL block will be run, this is not expected
So I add a duplicating check
Br
-Li
>
> /* No microcode */
> if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
> if (gds_mitigation != GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE)
> gds_mitigation =
> GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
> return;
> }
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